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This plan was accepted by the representatives of the Press and of the
Law School as likely to insure the widest possible distribution of the LAW
REviEw consistent with a subscription plan. The hope was expressed by the committee that, out of the 2,200 members of the State Bar,
as many as 1,500 would take advantage of this opportunity. It was agreed
that the expense of publication of the LAW REvIw over and above
such a sum as these subscriptions might yield would continue to be
borne by the Press.
At the October meeting of the Council this plan was presented and
approved, and at the annual meeting of the State Bar the following
day it was announced to the membership. As a result, this issue inaugurates a new department under the caption, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BAR, edited by Mr. Kemp D. Battle, of Rocky Mount.
The new financing plan will be carried into effect when bills for membership dues are distributed in January, 1937.
The significance of the action of the committees representing the two
bar organizations and of the Council as manifesting confidence in the
value of the LAW REVIEW is gratefully appreciated by the publisher
and by the editors.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Interest-Equity.
In an action on a certified check where the plaintiff was subrogated
to the rights of the government 1 the court took judicial notice of the
present well-known banking situation, and held that the payment of the
legal rate of interest should not be required, since the use of the funds
had not been lucrative to the bank or damaging to the plaintiff to that
extent. Interest was allowed at the rate of two per cent from the date
of demand, that being the prevailing rate upon savings bank deposits.In an action for the detention of money or the non-payment of liquidated claims, interest at the statutory rate is usually recoverable from
the date of demand,3 or if no formal demand is made, from the institution of the action. 4 However, in actions on claims against insolvent
'36 Stat. 965 (1911), 44 Stat. 120 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. 1546 (1935).
'American Tobacco Co. v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 15 F. Supp. 215
(E. D. S. C. 1936).
'Anderson v. Pacific Bank, 112 Cal. 598, 44 Pac. 1063 (1896) ; Hackleman v.
Moat, 4 Black. 164 (Ind. 1836); Thomas v. Wells, 140 Mass. 517, 5 N. E. 485
(1886); Cochrane v. Forbes, 267 Mass. 417, 166 N. E. 752 (1929); Mcllvaine v.
Wilkins, 12 N. H. 474 (1841) ; Hyman v. Gray, 49 N. C. 155 (1856); Crawford v.
.The Bank of Wilmington, 61 N. C. 136 (1867) ; Bank of Charlotte v. Hart, 67 N. C.
264 (1872); Neal v. Freeman, 85 N. C. 441 (1881); McRae v. Malloy, 87 N. C.
196 (1882); Porter v. Grimsley, 98 N. C. 550, 4 S. E. 529 (1887).
"Kaufman v. Tredway, 195 U. S. 271, 25 Sup. Ct. 33, 49 L.ed. 190 (1904) ; McIlvane v. Wilkins, 12 N. H. 474 (1841) ; Di Crano v. Moore, 50 App. Div. 361, 64
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banks most jurisdictions allow the recovery of interest only if the assets
of the bank are more than sufficient to pay the principal of all claims,
both preferred and non-preferred. 5
"In claims of equitable origin for the recovery of funds, the courts
seem not to confine themselves invariably to the legal rate in allowing interest as compensation, but to take into consideration the amount
which the custodian has earned." 6 This is particularly true in the
case of administrators, executors, and trustees who have acted in good
faith but have not entirely fulfilled their duties. 7 Also, though equity
generally follows the law as to "theallowance of interest, it may in its
discretion allow interest where it is not recoverable at law.8
Under its equitable jurisdiction the court in the principal case was
fully justified in taking judicial notice of the banking situation, as have
other courts in recent years been justified in taking judicial notice of
economic conditions. 9 The result reached is desirable and equitable,
N. Y. Supp. 3 (1900) ; Neal v. Freeman, 85 N. C. 441 (1881) ; Porter v. Grimsley,
98 N. C. 550, 4 S. E. 529 (1887).
r Green v. Stone, 205 Ala. 381, 87 So. 862 (1920) ; McGowan v. McDonald, 111
Cal. 57, 43 Pac. 418 (1896) ; People v. California Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 34
Cal. App. 269, 167 Pac. 181 (1917) ; Lamar v. Taylor, 141 Ga. 227, 80 S.E. 1085
(1914); Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, 210 Iowa 613, 231 N. W. 497, 69 A. L. R.
1210 (1930); People v. American Loan and Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 371, 65 N. E.
200 (1902); People v. Merchants' Trust Co., 187 N. Y. 293, 79 N. E. 1004
(1907); Ex Parte Stockman, 70 S. C. 31, 48 S. E. 736 (1904); State v. Park
Bank and Trust Co., 151 Tenn. 195, 268 S. W. 638, 39 A. L. R. 457 (1925);
Northwest Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 132 Wash. 449, 231
Pac. 951 (1925). Contra: American Nat Bank v. Williams, 101 Fed. 943 (C. C. A.
9th, 1900); American Surety Co. of New York v. Peyton, 186 Minn. 588, 244
N. W. 74 (1932), Shaw v. McCord, 18 S.W. (2d) 200 (Tex. 1929) ; see (1933) 11
N. C. L. Rv.155.
6 McCORMicK, DAMAGES
(1935) §52; Greenish v. Standard Sugar Refinery,
Fed. Cas. No. 5,776 (D. Mass. 1877) ; John Agnew Co. v. Board of Education, 83
N. J. Eq. 49, 89 Atl. 1046 (1914) (includes an excellent discussion of the principles involved) ; Backus v. Crane, 87 N. J. Eq. 229, 100 Atl. 900 (1917).
SI re Smith's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 680, 297 Pac. 927 (1931) ; Ford v. Wilson,
85 At. 1073 (Del. 1913) ; Britton v. Brewster's Estate, 113 Mich. 561, 71 N. W.
1085 (1897) ; In re Grover's Estate, 233 Mich. 467, 206 N. W. 988 (1926);
Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S.W. 333 (1916); In re Babcock's Estate,
2 Conn. 82, 9 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1889) ; In re Scudder's Estate, 21 Misc. 179, 47
N. Y. Supp. 101 (1897); In re Hoyt's Estate, 44 Misc. 76, 89 N. Y. Supp. 744
(1904) ; In re Wiley, 98 App. Div. 93, 91 N. Y. Supp. 661 (1904) ; Ellis v. Kelsey, 241 N. Y. 374, 150 N. E. 148 (1925) ; In re Haigh's Estate, 133 Misc. 240,
232 N. Y. Supp. 322 (1928) ; In re Ayvazian's Estate, 153 Misc. 467, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 123 (1934) ; Appeal of Van Dyke, 183 Pa. 647, 39 Atl. 2 (1898) ; In re
Hertzler's Estate, 192 Pa. 548, 43 Atl. 1028 (1899) ; Padelford v. Real Estate-Land
Title and Trust Co., 183 Atl. 442 (Pa. 1936); In re Listman's Estate, 57 Utah
471,8 197 Pac. 596 (1921).
McCowen v. Pew, 18 Cal. App. 482, 123 Pac. 354 (1912) ; Thompson v. Davis,
297 Ill.
11, 130 N. E. 455 (1921); Duncan v. Dazey, 318 Ill. 500, 149 N. E.
495 (1925) ; Goldman v. City of Worcester, 236 Mass. 319, 128 N. E. 410 (1920) ;
Woerz v. Schumacher, 161 N. Y. 530, 56 N. E. 72 (1900) ; Pryor v. City of Buffalo, 61 Misc. 162, 113 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1908).
United States v. Calistan Packers, 4 F. Supp. 660 (N. D. Cal. 1933) ; United
States Nat Bank and Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 69 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ;
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as it is well known that in most instances in recent years the legal rate
has not been realized on funds, and the plaintiff's damages probably did
not amount to more than the two per cent allowed. Also as the defendant
acted in good faith and had apparent grounds for the refusal of the
plaintiff's demand for payment, the bank, its depositors and creditors
should not be penalized by having to pay the legal rate of interest as
damages.
C. M. IVEY, JR.

Constitutional Law-Bankruptcy-Municipal Corporations.
Congress in 1934, by the Sumners-Wilcox Municipal Debt Readjustment Act,1 amended the Federal Bankruptcy Act2 to permit
any municipality or other political subdivision of any state to obtain
a voluntary readjustment of its debts through proceedings in the Federal courts. A Texas water improvement district, claiming to be insolvent and unable to meet its debts as they matured, petitioned the
United States District Court for a readjustment under the Sumners
Act.3 The Texas legislature in the meantime granted political subdivisions the express right to proceed under the Federal law. 4 The
United States Supreme Court held the act invalid as an unconstitutional encroachment upon state sovereignty over the fiscal affairs of
local governmental units,5 regardless of the express consent of the state.
The majority of the court felt that as the power "to establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" and the power "to lay and
collect taxes" were both granted in Article I, section 8 of the ConstituLowden v. Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 10 F. Supp. 430 (S. D.
Iowa 1935) ; Coral Gables Inc. v. Patterson, 166 So. 40 (Ala. 1936) ; Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889 (1933); Chicago' Title and Trust Co. v. Chicago
Trust Co., 1 N. E. (2d) 87 (Ill. 1936); Bolivar Tp. Board of Finance of Benton
County v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N. E. 158 (1934) ; United Shoe Stores Co.
v. Burt, 142 So. 370 (La. 1932); Campbell v. City of Boston, 195 N. E. 802
(Mass. 1935) ; Shonnard v. Elevator Supplies Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 94, 161 Atl. 684
(1932); Williams v. Williams, 12 N. J. Misc. 641, 174 Atl. 423 (1934); Kuhn
v. Cermac Realty Co., 148 Misc. 324, 265 N. Y 4 Supp. 861 (1933); In re .Connelly's Estate, 151 Misc. 310, 271 N. Y. Supp. 368 (1934); State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Gibbes, 171 S. C. 209, 172 S. E. 130 (1933); Dukes v. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co., 172 S.C. 502, 174 S.E. 463 (1934).
148 Stat. 798, 11 U. S. C. A. §§301, 303 (1934).
230 Stat. 554 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq. (1927).
381 re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103 (D. C.
Tex. 1934) (petition denied for lack of jurisdiction). Contra: Cameron County
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Ashton, 81 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ;
In re East Contra Costa Irrigation Dist., 10 F. Supp. 175 (D. C. Cal. 1935) ;
In re Imperial Irrigation Dist., 10 F. Supp. 832 (D. C. Cal. 1935), Note (1936)
34 Mice. L. REv. 731; see Carteret County v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of
the World, 78 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
'TEx. LAws (1935) c. 107.
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 892,
80 L. ed. adv. op. 910 (1936) (5-4 decision).
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ion, they should be limited equally. Therefore, since the Federal Government cannot tax the states,6 neither can it interfere with a state's
sovereignty by the exercise of the bankruptcy power.
The court's viewpoint of an infringement on states' rights seems
untenable. The Act specifically provides against any interference with
states' rights7 because: (1) the governmental units may not act except
by a voluntary petition ;8 (2) this petition must have the written approval of the state agency if one has been created to handle municipal
insolvency problems ;9 (3) the Federal judge must approve the plan of
readjustment. 10 This element of consent would seem to remove the objection of interference with states' rights since either government may
tax the other if consent is given,"- and a state may even interfere with
interstate or foreign commerce with consent of the Federal government. 1 2 Therefore if consent will validate a taxation burden there should
be no objection to a beneficial debt readjustment privilege. 13 Fear of
a future extension so as to amount to an encroachment is completely
14
obliterated by judicial review of the Supreme Court.

It was thought that the Act would be attacked upon the ground that
municipalities are not the proper subject of bankruptcy, 15 there being
no distributable assets, as property used for governmental purposes is
not subject to attachment and private property of citizens may be
reached only by taxation. However, distributable assets have been
deemed unnecessary in the past,' 6 and recent opinions appear to support this view.17 Nor is the Act hostile to the nature of bankruptcy
8
Collector v. Day, 78 U. S. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1870) ; cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819) (states cannot tax instrumentalities of Fed-

eral Gov't).
748 Stat. 798 §80(k), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(k) (1934).
848 Stat. 798 §80(a), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(a) (1934).
'48 Stat. 798 §80(k), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(k) (1934).

Stat. 798 §80(a), 11 U. S. C. A. §303(a) (1934).
Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 545, 56 Sup. Ct. 417,
80 L. ed. 588 (1936) ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 56 Sup. Ct. 421,
1048

80 L. ed. 367 (1936).
'Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. ed. 572 (1891)
James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., 242 U. S. 311,

37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917) ; Whitfield v. Ohio, 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 80 L. ed.

527 (1936).
n

"

(1935) 83 U~xv. OF PA. L. REv. 920.
(1936) 34 MICH. L. REv. 1252, 1254.

'The

Court assumed "for this discussion that the enactment is adequately

related to the general subject
Jurisdiction be Extended to
divisions? (1933) 19 A. B. A.
10 See Vulcan Sheet Metal

106, 108 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).

of bankruptcies." But see Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy
Include Municipalities and Other Taxable Sub-

J. 637;

GLENN, LiQUIDATION

(1934) §419.

Co. v. North Platte Valley Irrigation Co., 220 Fed.

' See: In re Bradford, 7 F., Supp. 665 (D. Md. 1934) ; In re Radford, 8 F.
Supp. 489 (W. D. Ky. 1934), res/d by Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 79 L. ed. 1593 (1935), but on grounds of
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by providing for a composition agreement' 8 because composition was
specifically granted by the bankruptcy act of 1867 and is available in
our existing statute.' 9 Therefore it would appear that the exclusion
of municipalities in past bankruptcy legislation has been for reasons
other than any inherent disability of the municipality. 2 0 As Mr. Justice
Cardozo explains in his vigorous dissent, the concept of the field to be
included within the term "Bankruptcy" has been a growing one, and
"the act for the relief of local governmental units is a stage in an evolutionary process which is likely to be misconceived unless regarded as a
2
whole." 1
The situation which gave rise to the passage of the Sumners Act
was and still is a serious one. Commencing with the collapse of the
Florida "boom" in 1926 there has been an ever increasing number of
municipal defaults in recent years. There were approximately 2,600
taxing districts, in 41 states, in default on November 1, 1934. Their aggregate defaults represented about 10 per cent of the total indebtedness of states and their local units. 22 The result was that local taxing
agents were being subjected to continuous mandamus actions to compel them to tax and tax again to pay off creditors. This in turn was
having a detrimental effect upon the credit of solvent taxing agents.
Numerous schemes of voluntary refunding were devised and tried by
the local governments with varying degrees of success. Also many states
passed special legislation in an attempt to effectuate an adequate remedy. None were very successful because the Constitution expressly
prohibits the States from passing any law impairing existing contracts.
Federal action under the express constitutional power to enact bankruptcy legislation was necessary to avoid this constitutional restriction.
There was little hope of a composition by consent of creditors as a miviolation of due process clause of U. S. Constitution. Insolvency is not a necessary factor for bankruptcy jurisdiction. In re Foster Paint and Varnish Co.,
210 Fed. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1914) ; George M. West Co. v. Lea Brothers and Co., 174
U. S.590, 19 Sup. Ct. 836, 43 L. ed. 1098 (1899).
"Iln re Reiman, Fed. Cas. No. "11, 673 (D. C. N. Y. 1874) ;aff(d. N01 111,675
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875).

"30 Stat. 554 (1898), 11 U. S. C A. §§30, 32 (c.) (1927).
re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; 7 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTcY (4th ed. 1935) §§3155.19, 3155.01.
'Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 892,
898, 80 L. ed. adv. op. 910, 916, 917 (1936). For a history of the bankruptcy
'In

clause see: WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN THM UNITED STATES (1935)

9; (1932)

17

MARQ. L. REV. 163; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S.555,
587, 588, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 862, 79 L. ed. 1593,.1603, 1604 (1934) ; Continental Ill.
National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, 294
U. S.648, 667, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 602, 79 L. ed. 1110, 1123 (1935).
118 PuB. MANAG. 178 (1936); 24 NAT. Mum REv. 32,335 (1935); Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 186 and H. R.
5950, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) 12.
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nority group of bondholders would invariably refuse to accept a new
arrangement. The Sunmers Act remedied this by making recalcitrant
holders accede to the plans of the majority.
Undoubtedly, governmental units actually petitioning the courts under the Municipal Debt Readjustment Act would, because of the publicity
gained thereby, have their immediate future credit injured. But in the
majority of cases the Act would not have to be used. The greatest
value of the Act was that its presence would serve as a "persuasive
influence" with which to threaten minority bondholders into agreement, thus making actual court action a last resort in extreme cases.23
Since the Court has denied a petition to rehear,24 a solution to the
problem must be found through legislative action by the respective
states. A few have enacted measures to deal with the problem. A summary of the action taken by the various states is given in "Legislation
25
and Municipal Debt" in the American Bar Association Journal.
26
New Jersey authorized readjustment procedure through the state
supreme court. On a petition of the bondholders to the court stating
that the municipality has defaulted, a Justice, if satisfied as to the default, may file an order to that effect, after which the municipality may
seek the aid of the Municipal Finance Commission in refunding. The
Commission then takes charge of the finances of the municipality until
the indebtedness is within all statutory limits.
Oregon2 7 also provides for control over defaulting municipalities
-by court action. Holders of defaulted obligations may petition the
county court, which, with the consent of the municipality, appoints an
administrator who takes over the financial affairs of the local unit. Refunding or liquidating plans must be approved by the court.
In Connecticut 28 when a municipality defaults on relief bonds, the
State Emergency Relief Commission may apply to the superior court
for the appointment of a receiver to have complete control of the financial affairs of the municipality.
Massachusetts,2 9 on three occasions, has passed statutes which placed
the finances of three defaulting municipalities in separate state commissions, the members of which were appointed by the Governor.
I For a report of the action taken under the Sumners-Wilcox Act throughout the United States see: 25 NAT. MUN. REv. 328 (1936).
" Ten states through their respective Attorneys General filed a brief as amici
curiae in support of a petition for a rehearing by the Supreme Court. 4 U. S.
Law Week 1 (1936). Petition for rehearing denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 5 (1936).
21 A. B. A. J. 370 (1935) ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed.
197 (1880) (action taken by Tennessee in 1877).
IN. 3. LAWS (1931) c. 340, S. B. §365.
'ORE. LAws (1933) c. 433, p. 1.
'CONN.
GEN. STATS. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, part II.
'MASS.
ACTS 1931 c. 44; AcTs 1932 c. 223; ACTs 1933 c. 341.
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3

Virginia " has a harsh law for defaulting counties. It allows the Governor, upon petition by the bondholders, to order the state comptroller to withhold payments to the county of state funds (except school
funds) until the default is overcome.
Montana 31 provides for refunding if the refunding plan is approved
by the state examiner.
The default problem in North Carolina3 2 has been handled through
the Local Government Commission which advises and aids local units
in drafting refunding plans.
If neither Federal nor State action alone can solve this problem
adequately, it has been suggested that a desirable result might be reached
by making their legislation complementary. Through the "full faith
and credit" clause "Congress might exercise its bankruptcy power by an
act which would recognize the validity of state adjudications and state
discharges wherever the jurisdiction of Congress extends." 33
All of the above legislation has been an attempt to remedy the evil
after it has come into existence. The state legislatures should prevent
the formation of this evil in the future by enacting strict measures
which would prevent local governmental units from burdening themselves during "boom" periods with excessive and unnecessary bonded
indebtedness.
W. C. HOLT.
Constitutional Law-Minimum Wage Legislation.
The United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision 1 recently declared unconstitutional a New York minimum wage statute2 for women.
The Court based its conclusion entirely upon the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital,3 which banned an attempt of Congress to regulate wages
for women in the District of Columbia as an "unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the guaranties of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
IVA. LAWS (1932) c. 148.
MoNT. LAws (EXTRA SEssioN 1933) c. 6.
In North Carolina over 250 local units have defaulted in the last siZ years.

(1936). 25 NAT. MUN. REv. 323. There are at present 24 counties and 98 cities and
towns in default, 3 Pop. GOV'T 16 (1936).
(1935) 22 VA. LAW REv. 39; (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 702 (discussing comity by
the Federal Courts to state statutory receiverships of defaulting municipalities).
'Morehead

v. People of New York, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed. Adv. op. 921

(1936).
2 N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill's, Cum. Supp. 1931-1935) c. 32, §§550-567. Statute
set up a wage board to conduct investigations concerning wage payment and to
determine minimum wages in certain industries upon proof that the employee
was being paid an "oppressive wage."

An oppressive wage was defined as one

"less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than
sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health." Violation
of this act was punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both.
2261 U. S.525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1922).
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The condemning feature of the District of Columbia statute was
that it required the employer to pay a sum sufficient to supply "the necessary cost of living" to the woman employee, thus exacting from him,
in the words of the Court, "an arbitrary payment for a purpose and
upon a basis having no causal connection with his business." 4 The majority stated that the statute looked at only the side of the employee and
failed to consider the equal rights of the employer, thus leaving the impression that an act which would take into consideration the rights of
both parties to the employment contract might be valid.
In addition to the standard used in the District of Columbia statute,
and for the protection of the employer, the New York law added another requirement to its "living wage"; namely, that the amount paid
be "reasonably commensurate with the services rendered." 5 A minimum
wage, to be fair, must weigh the equities and needs of both employer
and employee, as the New York Legislature undoubtedly intended should
be done. Yet, the majority in the present case failed to see any sound
distinction in the two acts on this point and argued that the acts differed
merely in "details, methods, and time."
"There is grim irony," the minority believe, "in speaking of the freedom of contract of those who, because of their economic necessities,
give their services for less than is needful to keep body and soul together."0
This freedom of contract that the Court believed so essential
to personal liberty is not without restraint: businesses charged with a
public interest may be regulated;t the character, method and time for
payment of wages may be governed;8 hours of labor may be fixed ;9
and even wages may be set to meet and tide over a temporary economic
IId. at 558, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 at 401, 67 L. ed. 785 at 796.
rN. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill's Cum. Supp. 1931-35) c. 32, §551(8).
'Morehead v. People of New York, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 932, 80 L. ed. Adv. Op.
921, 937 (1936).
' Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1877) (Congress may regulate
storage charges in grain elevators) ; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct.
124, 48 L. ed. 148 (1903) (regulating hours of labor for employees of municipal
corporation) ; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755. (1916)
(regulating wages and hours of interstate railroad employees); Block v. Hirsh,
256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1920) (letting of houses in the Dis-

trict of Columbia may become of such a public interest as to authorize legislative
interference).
8

McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. ed. 315 (1908).
(In those mines where it was customary to pay workers according to a specified
rate -per ton of raw coal, statute required coal to be weighed before screening).

'Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780 (1898) (state
regulation of hours the coal miner worked underground) ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243

U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L. ed. 830 (1916) (limitation on number of hours
that employees worked in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment in the
state) ; see Note (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 156.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

52
10

The Court in the Adkins case, however, was unable to put
exigency.
within the purview of these exceptions. It was not
of
Congress
the Act
applicable solely to, businesses of a public nature, nor was it made a
temporary measure; rather, it established a permanent policy for the
District of Columbia. It made no effort to govern the character, method,
or periods of wage payments, nor to prescribe hours or conditions under
which labor was to be done. By holding the New York Act irdistinguishable from the one considered in the Adkins case, the majority precluded
any argument that this statute might be within these well defined exceptions.
Minimum wage legislation is by no means new. 11 Massachusetts was the pioneer in this field, enacting laws for the control
of wages as early as 1912.12 The problem was first presented to the
United States Supreme Court in 1914 when an Oregon statute was held
constitutional by a 4-4 vote in Stettler v. O'Hara.13 Two years later,
an act of Congress establishing a temporary minimum wage schedule
applicable only to interstate railroads was pronounced to be within
14
With this rather
constitutional limitations as an emergency measure.
meager precedent, the Adkins case denied the authority of Congress to
enact general minimum wage legislation.' 5
Notwithstanding the Adkins case, and regarding as doubtful the effect it might have upon subsequent legislation, several states due to
changed economic conditions have enacted legislation for wage regulation of women workers.' 6 The state courts have not found it difficult
to uphold these statutes as a vaild exercise of the police power for the
protection of the health and morals of the woman worker and for the
" Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1916) (act passed
to counteract a temporary interruption of interstate commerce due to a railroad
labor dispute).
'The first English statutes passed for wage regulation were the ORDINANCE
in 1351, requiring all persons
of LABoRERs in 1349 and the STATUTE OF LABo0s
of certain classes to work, and carefully fixing the most minute details of the
wages rather than
wage contract. In effect, these two statutes fixed maximumn
minimum.
= MASS. AcTs AND RESOLVES (1912) c. 706.
243 U. S. 629, 37 Sup. Ct. 475, 61 L. ed. 937. Although the case was argued
in Dec. 1914, the decision was not handed down until April, 1917.
x'Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1916).
In 1923, the Court, in a memorandum decision, felt itself bound by the
Adkins case, and declared unconstitutional an Arizona statute which was substantially like the District of Columbia statute. Murphy v. Sardle, 269 U. S. 530,
46 Sup. Ct. 22, 70 L. ed. 396 (1923).
" CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) §3613; CoLo. ComP. LAWS (1921)
§§4263-4283; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 48, §§238-256 (by express provision,
in force only until July 1, 1935) ; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§4210-4232; N. H.
Pun. LAWS (1933) c. 87; N. J. LAws (1933) c. 152; N. Y. CoNS. LAWs (Cahill
Cum. Supp. 1931-35) c. 32, §§550-567; OHio LAWS (1933) p. 502; ORE. CODE ANN.
(1930) §§49-301-49-319; S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) §§10022-A-10022-E; UTAH
LAWS (1933) c. 39; WASH. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Rev. 1932) §§7630-7641.
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future well-being of the entire race.' 7 In an important Washington
case, which shows the attitude adopted by these tribunals, the court
justified its decision -by saying that the Adkins case is not conclusive as
to the validity of a state law "enacted in the exercise of the police power
of the state."' 8
It is not inconceivable that the Court could have found substantial
difference in the District of Columbia statute and the New York wage
law to justify a distinction between the two. Nor is it at all unlikely
that the Court might have reached an opposite result had it considered
the constitutional question involved from the broader aspects of presentday social policy. However, as a practical question, would it be advisable
to regulate the wages of women workers when no such regulation is
placed on men? If so, many industries might discharge their women
employees and replace them with men willing to work for less than the
state has set for women. Furthermore, a minimum wage might become a maximum wage. Lastly, was the Court, in passing on the validity of the New York Wage Law, defining a fundamental right of individuals to bargain for the amount of wages to be paid and received,
subject to regulation by neither federal nor state government?
0. W. CLAYTON, JR.
Criminal Law-Double jeopardy.
A and B while together, were held up and robbed by the defendants. A was killed. The defendants were tried and found innocent of the
murder of A. Subsequently, they were indicted for robbery with firearms of B to which they pleaded not guilty and former jeopardy. The
plea of former jeopardy was overruled; the North Carolina Supreme
Court held the tvo crimes separate and distinct, as there was no identity
of offenses.'
It is a fundamental principle that a person cannot be tried twice for
the same offense, and a plea of former acquittal or conviction will be
sustained, 2 if the defendant could have been convicted under the first
1'Holcombe
v. Creamer, 213 Mass. 99, 120 N. E. 354 (1918); Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495 (1917); Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Ore.
261, 141 Pac. 158 (1914) ;Malette v. City of Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496
(1913) ; Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918). Contrc Topeka
Laundry Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 119 Kan. 12, 237 Pac. 1041 (1925) ;
see Stevenson v. St. Clair, 161 Minn.444, 201 N. W. 629 (1925) (statute constitutional as to minors).
"West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 55 P. (2d) 1083, 1089 (Wash. 1936).
Probable jurisdiction of the case is noted in 57 Sup. Ct. 40. If certiorari is granted,
this case is expeoted to decide more definitely the constitutionality of minimum
wage legislation, and clear up the doubts left by the -principal case.

'State v. Dills and Osborne, 210 N. C.178, 185 S.E. 677 (1936).
'See State v. Mansfield, 207 N. C. 233, 236, 176 S. E. 761, 762 (1934) ; N. C.

CoNsT., art. 1, §17; U. S. CowsT., Amm,. V.
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indictment. The determination of whether one is being tried twice for
the "same offense" is accompanied with no little difficulty.
Where crimes against two persons grow out of one act it has been
consistently held that a prosecution and conviction, or acquittal, as to
4
one of the victims is no bar to a prosecution as to the other victim.
"To support a plea of former acquittal it is not sufficient that the two
prosecutions should grow out of the same transaction; but they must
be for the same offense, in both fact and law."5, The test applied in Rex.
v. VandercombO and introduced into the law of this state 7 is: "Could
the defendant have been convicted on the first indictment upon proof
of the facts, not as brought forward in evidence, but as alleged in the
record of the second. ' 8 If this be answered in the affirmative the defendant is being tried twice for the same offense.
In the principal case the first indictment was for the murder of A.
The defendants could not possibly be convicted under that indictment
upon proof of robbery with firearms of B. Accordingly, the offenses
are separate and distinct.
A single act may be an offense against the statutes of two governments9 and if either statute requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does
not exempt the defendant from prosecution under the other. In such
a case the offenses are not the same in law and in fact. 10 Here again,
the victims are different personalities, and for that reason the offense
against each is separate and distinct."
'State v. Birmingham,'44 N. C. 120 (1852) ; State v. Gibson, 170 N. C. 697,
86 S. E. 774 (1915).

'State v. Yancy, 4 N. C. 133 (1814) (contempt of court-assault and battery);
State v. Nash, 86 N. C. 650 (1881) (shooting) ; State v. Bynum, 117 N, C. 752,
23 S. E. 219 (1895) (larceny).
'State v. Nash, 86 N. C. 650, 651 (1881).
'2 Leach C. C. 708 (1796) (The defendant was acquitted of breaking and entering a dwelling and stealing. He was subsequently tried for breaking and entering with intent to steal.).
' State v. Nash, 86 N. C. 650 (1881).
" State v. Nash, 86 N. C. 650, 656 (1881). Ashe, J., dissenting: "In many cases
it would be impossible to ascertain, except by the evidence, whether the offenses
are the same, when there are different indictments for offenses that are
of the same grade and character." State v. Hankins, 136 N. C. 621, 623, 48 S. E.
593, 594 (1904). "But this would not remove the fault unless the rule is further extended so as in terms to include the right of the, defendant to prove the
identity of the offenses charged in the two indictments, which might otherwise appear to be different."
' State v. Taylor, 133 N. C. 755, 46 S. E. 5 (1903) (disturbing the peace-assault
and battery) ; State v. Stevins, 114 N. C. 873, 19 S. E. 861 (1894) (failure to procure state and municipal whiskey license) ; State v. Reid 115 N. C. 741, 20 S. E.
468 (1894) ; State v. Lytle, 138 N. C. 738, 51 S. E. 66 (1905) ; State v. Harrison,
184 N. C. 762, 114 S. E. 830 (1922) (violation of state and federal prohibition

law).
" State v. Taylor, 133 N. C. 755, 46 S. E. 5 (1903).
' See State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. 873, 877, 19 S. E. 861, 862 (1894)

(where a
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Where the second indictment is for a crime greater in degree than
the first, and where both indictments arise out of the same act, it is
held that an acquittal or conviction for the first is a bar to a prosecution
for the second. 12 If there could be a prosecution for the greater offense the defendant would be tried twice for the lesser crime,' 3 as he
could be convicted of the lesser crime when tried for the greater one. 14
If "the same offense" means literally the same offense, it would seem
that the defendant is not being tried twice for the same crime, but only
twice for the same act. The state, however, should not be allowed to
divide an offense consisting of several trespasses into as many indictments as there are acts of trespass that would separately support an indictment, and afterwards indict for the offense compounded of them all.
An exception to the rule is made when the first indictment is procured
by the collusion of the defendant.15 A conviction thereon is no bar to
a subsequent indictment regularly brought. Under the first indictment
the defendant is not in jeopardy for he is holding his fate in his own
hand.
Where the second indictment is for a crime less in degree than the
first, and where both indictments arise out of the same act, and the defendant could have been convicted under the first indictment of the
lesser crime, the plea of former acquittal or conviction has been uniformly upheld.' 6 In this situation the defendant could not be convicted
license is required by the state and another by the town, selling the same glass
of liquor may be a violation of the town ordinance and also a violation of the
state law, if license has not been obtained from both; and further, the same act
may be punishable by the federal government if in violation of its statute, and if
the purchaser is a minor the same single act may constitute a fourth distinct offense of selling spiritous liquor to a minor-and even a fifth if the sale is on
Sunday).
" State v. Ingles, 3 N. C. 4 (1797) (assault and battery-riot, beating, imprisoning) ; State v. Lewis, 9 N. C. 98 (1821) (larceny-robbery) ; State v. Albertson,
113 N. C. 633, 18 S. E. 321 (1893) (assault-affray) ; State v. Bell, 205 N. C. 225,
171 S. E. 50 (1933) (burglary-murder); State v. Clemmons, 207 N. C. 276, 176
S. E. 760 (1934) (arson-murder).
'14State v. Lewis, 9 N. C. 98 (1821).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§4639, 4640.
'State v. Moore, 136 N. C. 581, 48 S. E. 573 (1904) (indictment for simple
assault procured at the solicitation of the defendant was held no bar to subsequent
prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon regularly brought); cf. State v.
Cale, 150 N. C. 805, 63 S. E. 958 (1909).
"oState v. Stanly, 49 N. C. 290 (1857) (affray-assault and battery. Associate Justice Battle, alone, intimated that in the case of a former conviction a different result should be reached from the case of a former acquittal. He, stated that the
test laid down in Rex. v Vandercomb applied only when there was
a former acquittal of the greater crime and that there must be an exception
in favor of a former conviction.) ; State v. Lindsay, 61 N. C. 468 (1867) (riotintent to rape. It is specifically pointed out at page 102 that the defendant could
not be convicted of assault with intent to commit rape upon an indictment for
rape. Subsequent to this case N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4639 was passed
by the legislature, providing for conviction of assault upon an indictment for
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under the first indictment upon the facts alleged in the second, but he
could be convicted of the lesser crime upon the first indictment as the
greater crime includes the smaller.' 7 If the acts alleged in the second
indictment are used against the defendant in the first, it is manifest that
8
there is double jeopardy.'
Where there are two transactions and two separate crimes arise,10
or where there is a repetition of the same crime, 20 a prosecution for one
offense is clearly no bar to the other. If there is only one transaction
and separate and distinct statutes are violated, the same result is
reached. 2 '
Where there is a failure to perform a legal duty, that omission of
duty cannot be divided into separate offenses, because one prosecution
22
will be a bar to subsequent proceedings.
The principal case is consistent with those cases holding that crimes
arising out of one transaction and invading the rights of two persons
are separate and distinct offenses. Plainly, the defendant is not being
put in double jeopardy when prosecuted separately for the offense against
each victim. Just as the victims are different, the offenses are different.
C. C. BENNETT.
Criminal Law-Solicitation.
The defendant told a fifteen-year-old boy that if he would set fire to
a certain dwelling he would reward him with a pistol and furnish him
with the necessary matches and oil. The boy assented to the plan but
upon leaving the defendant, disclosed it to the officers. The North
rape. It is believed this statute would alter the result reached in this case, making it consistent with the other cases).

N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§4639, 4640.

State v. Lindsay, 61 N. C. 468 (1867) ; State v. Lawson and Cheatham, 123

N. C. 740, 31 S. E. 667 (1898) ; State v. Freeman, 162 N. C. 594, 77 S.E. 780,

(1913) ; Cf. State v. Hankins, 136 N. C. 621, 48 S. E. 593 (1904).
" State v. Robinson, 116 N. C. 1047, 21 S. E. 701 (1895) (concealed weaponassault and battery); State v. Hooker, 145 N. C. 581, 59 S. E. 866 (1907)
(stealing-breaking and entering) ; State v. Mansfield, 207 N. C. 233, 176 S.E. 761
(1934) (bastardy-abandonment).
0 State v. Williams, 94 N. C. 891 (1886)
(selling liquor to different persons);
State v. White, 146 N. C 608, 60 S.E. 505 (1908) (carrying concealed weapon
on different occasions); State v. Jones, 201 N. C. 424, 160 S. E. 468 (1931)
(abandonment of children).
'State v. Pierce, 208 N. C. 47, 179 S. E. 8 (1935) (burning barn-burning
personal property in barn).
' State v. Roberson, 136 N. C. 591, 48 S.E. 596 (1904) (prosecution for failure to get an annual license bars a further prosecution within the year) ; State v.
Commissioners of Fayetteville, 6 N. C. 371 (1818) (prosecution for failure to
keep one street in repair bars a further prosecution as to other streets in disrepair
at the same time) ; cf. State v. Jones, 201 N. C. 424, 160 S.E. 468 (1931) (failure
to support children is continuing offense and prosecution therefore is not barred
by conviction for prior time).
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Carolina Supreme Court held the defendant guilty of the common-law
offense of soliciting the commission of a felony.1
This is a case of first impression in North Carolina, though the
solicitation of another to commit a felony was ruled a common-law offense in Rex v. Higgi=2 in 1801. The holding of the principal case
is in line with the overwhelming weight of authority.3
The offense of solicitation, a misdemeanor, 4 is complete when the
solicitor has attempted to persuade another to commit a crime.
Whether or not the person solicited consents, or having consented,
makes an effort to commit the crime is of no moment. 5 The act of soliciting is punishable as it, in and of itself, is sufficient to take the case
out of the sphere of mere intent.
A few states have made solicitation an offense by statutory enactment.6 In the absence of statutes it has been held indictable as a com8
7
mon-law offense to solicit any person to commit larceny, murder,
2
1
arson,0 sodomy, 10 assault and battery, " and adultery.'
'State v. Tony Hampton, 210 N. C. 283, 186 S. E. 251 (1936).
'2 East. 5. The defendant solicited a servant to steal his master's goods. Held:
defendant guilty of a misdemeanor, although the indictment did not charge that
the servant stole the goods, nor that any other act waA done other than the soliciting.
'United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (D. C. D. Mass. 1917); State v.
Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 Atl. 805 (1923); State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 90
At. 220 (1914) ; Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545 (1883) ; People v. Hammond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W. 1084 (1903); State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo. App. 75,
84 S. W. 105 (1904); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 23 At. 388
(1892) ; State v. Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 488 (1892) ; Wiseman v. Com"monwealth, 143 Va. 631, 130 S. E. 249 (1925) ; Rudolph v. State, 128 Wis. 222,
107 N. W. 466 (1906) ; see State v. Hudon, 103 Vt. 17, 20, 151 Atl. 562, 564 (1930) ;
Blackburn, Solicitation to Cri-me (1934) 40 W. VA.. L. REV. 135. But see Cox
v. People, 82 Ill. 191, 192, 193 (1876) ; 1 BISHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923)
§768, c. 2; 1 MCCLAIN, CRIMINAL LAW (1897) §220.
'State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828); State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo. App. 75, 84
S. W. 105 (1904) ; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405 (1897).
'United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (D. C. D. Mass. 1917) ; State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 90 Atl. 220 (1914); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545
(1883); People v. Hammond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W. 1084 (1903); State v.
Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 488 (1892) ; see State v. Hudon, 103 Vt 17, 20, 151
Atl. 562, 564 (1930).
'CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1935) §653f (solicitation of certain felonies);
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §6072 (solicitation of injury to person or property);
IOWA CODE (1935) §12917 (solicitation of murder); VT. PUB. LAws (1933) c.
349, §8746 (solicitation of felonies).
I State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 At. 805 (1923).
'Commonwealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 23 Atl. 388 (1892); see State v.
Lourie, 12 S. W. (2d) 43, 45 (Mo. 1928).
'State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 90 Atl. 220 (1914) ; Commonwealth v. Flagg,
135 Mass. 545 (1883) ; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405 (1897);
State v. Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 488 (1892)
" See State v. George, 79 Wash. 262, 140 Pac. 337, 339 (1914).
'United States v. Lyman, Fed. Cas. No. 15646 (C. C. D. Mass. 1818).
"State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828). Contra: Smith v. Commonwealth, 54
Pa. 209 (1867) (adultery in Pa. was a misdemeanor, not a felony).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Though the crime is apparently clear and definite there has been
much confusion in its application. Not infrequently it has been confused with an attempt to commit a crime.' 3 The soliciting of another
is not a sufficient act--"a step in the direction of the crime"i-to
constitute an attempt, and as against one who is merely guilty of solicitation an indictment for an attempt will not lie.' 4 Further, solicitation
may be distinguished from an attempt as it is the act of a person who
solicits another to commit a, crime; while an attempt is the act of one
who himself intends to commit the crime. Both are substantive offenses
and should be treated as separate and distinct.
Though the courts have almost unanimously held the solicitation of a
felony to be an offense, the courts differ when the solicitation is of a misdemeanor. One line of authority rules that there can be no offense of solicitation of a misdemeanor, 15 while another rules it a crime if the misdemeanor is of a "high or aggravated type". 16 The latter view seems the
better, as the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is usually
arbitrary, being governed by no fixed or definite principles, as there is
apparently no intrinsic difference between the two.'1 Also, often, certain misdemeanors are more detrimental to the interests of society
than many of the felonies. The solicited crime in the principal case being that of arson, the North Carolina court was not called upon to
rule on the misdemeanor problem.
It is to be hoped that in the future the North Carolina doctrine of
solicitation will be extended to include "high or aggravated misdemeanors".
S. J. STERN, JR.
"See State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 438, 439, 440, 121 At. 805, 806, 807
(1923) ; State v. Lavine, 96 N. J. 356, 358, 115 Atl. 335, 336 (1921) ; State v. Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 264, 14 S. E. 488, 489 (1892) ; State v. George, 79 Wash. 262, 140
Pac. 337, 338 (1914) ; State v. Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90, 92 (1885).
1State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 90 AtI. 220 (1914); State v. Bowles, 70
Kan. 821, 79 Pac. 726 (1905) ; McDade v. People, 29 Mich. 50 (1874) ; State v.
Lampe, 131 Minn. 65, 154 N. W. 737 (1915); State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6
S. W. (2d) 609 (1928) ; Stabler v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 318 (1880); Hicks v.
Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S. E. 1024 (1889) ; State v., Butler, 8 Wash. 194,
35 Pac. 1093 (1894) ; State v. Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90 (1885) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL,
CRIMES (3d ed. 1927) §133. Contra: State v. Taylor, 47 Ore. 455, 84 Pac. 82
(1906); BIsHoP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1913) §74.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 54 Pa. 209 (1867) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIIES
(3d ed. 1927) §132.
"State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 At. 805 (1923); Cox v. People, 82
Ill. 191 (1876) ; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405 (1897) ; State v.
Keyes, 8 Vt. 57 (1836) ; see United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977, 978 (D. C. D.
Mass. 1917) ; Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545, 549 (1883) ; State v. Butler, 8 Wash. 194, 35 Pac. 1093, 1094 (1894).
x'"The statutory classification of crime, as felony or misdemeanor, is governed
by no fixed or definite principle, but is purely arbitrary. Legislative whim or
caprice may alone determine in Which category an offense, not a felony at common
law, shall be placed." Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405, 409 (1898).
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Deeds--Reversions-Conveyance to Heirs General of Grantor.
Grantor conveyed land to her daughter and the daughter's husband,
for their joint lives, then to the survivor, remainder after the determination of the life estate to the daughter's children, begotten by her said
husband, in fee simple; and in the event she had no children by the said
husband, then an estate in fee simple forever, to the right heirs of the
grantor. Subsequently the grantor, the daughter and her husband
conveyed the land in fee simple to the defendant's grantor. The original
grantor died first; then the husband. Finally, the grantor's daughter
died leaving no children. Plaintiffs, collateral heirs of the grantor, sued
for the land. Held, judgment for defendants. A reversion was created
in the grantor upon the happening of the contingency, and her heirs
take by descent rather than by purchase; therefore, they take nothing,
their ancestor having previously granted the reversion.1
According to the English common law if an owner of land in fee
simple sought to convey a life estate or an estate in tail, with a remainder
to the grantor's heirs, the remainder was void and the grantor had a reversion in fee simple 2 which would go to his heirs, if at all, by descent
and not by purchase. The reason for the rule was that to allow the
heirs to take as purchasers would have deprived the grantor's overlord
of the feudal rights of wardship and marriage in the case of 'a minor
heir.3 This rule was a positive rule of law like the rule in Shelley's
Case, and was applied in every case where the limitation was to the
heirs general of the grantor.4 England in 1833, by statute, abolished the
rule and since that time a grantor's or devisor's heirs take as purchasers. 5
The rule is strictly applied in some American jurisdictions as a positive
rule of law,6 in others it has been entirely ignored, 7 while some states
have applied the rule as one of construction, having given consideration
8
to the intent of the grantor as gathered from the whole instrument.
North Carolina has recognized the principle that where the grantor
1

Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936).
'Godolphin v. Abingdon, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Reprint 432 (1740); 1 Simes,
FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §144; Comment (1934) 20 CORN. L. Q. 116.

'1
'1
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(1936) §145.
(1936) §147.
&4 WiLL. IV, C. 106, §3 (1833).

Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS
Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS

'West Tenn. Co. v. Townes, 52 F. (2d) 764 (D. C. Miss. 1931); Hobbie v.
Ogden, 178 Ill. 357, 53 N. E. 104 (1899) ; Nickols v. Davis, 188 Ky. 215, 221 S. W.
507 (1920) ; Williams v. Green, 128 Miss. 446, 91 S. 39 (1922) ; Robinson v. Blankenship, 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S. W. 854 (1906).

'Hall v. Realty and Investment Co., 306 Mo. 182, 267 S. W. 407 (1924) ; New

Jersey Title Co. v. Parker, 84 N. 3. Eq. 351, 93 Ati. 196 (1915), aff'd, 85 N. J. Eq.
557, 96 Atl. 574 (1915) ; (1934) 20 CORN L. Q. 116, 117 n. 10.
'Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919), Comment (1919) 4
28 YALE L. J. 713; Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929) ; Comment (1929) 29 CoL. L. REV.
837; 1 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §147.
CORN. L. Q. 83; Comment (1920)
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in a conveyance attempts, after creating a particular estate in favor of
another, to limit by the same instrument a fee simple estate in favor of
his heirs general who would properly take such an estate by descent
from him, the limitation is invalid, and the grantor is regarded as having the reversion in fee simple. 9 The mere fact that the estate is called
a remainder does not preclude the holding that it is in effect a reversion.10 It is said that at common law such a remainder could not divest
the grantor of the fee, under the rule that nemo est haeres viventis-no
one is the heir of a living person."' However, the decisions, considered
as a whole, are in confusion as to whether North Carolina has the rule
and if so whether it is an inexorable rule of property. Some cases have
construed a limitation to the heirs of the testator as a remainder ;12
others have said it was a reversion ;13 and still others, without considering the application of the rule under discussion, have digressed on the
question as to whether the heirs of the testator should be determined
as a group on the death of the life tenant, or in the orthodox manner,
at the death of the settlor.' 4 The operation of the common law rule
may be affected by C. S. §1739 which provides that limitations by
deed, will or other writing, to the heirs of a living person, shall be construed to be the children of such person unless a contrary intention appears by the deed or will. 1' The present writer has found but one case
in which the statute was applied. 16 There a limitation to the heirs of
the grantor was was construed to mean children, since it was clear from
an examination of the entire deed that the grantor did not contemplate
surviving his wife or that there was a possibility of reverter in him. The
'King v. Scoggins, 92 N. C. 99 (1885) ; Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84
S. E. 347 (1915).
"°King v. Scoggins, 92 N. C. 99 (1885) (principle recognized that although
the limitation is called a remainder, it may be in effect a reversion).
'See Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 334, 84 S. E. 347, 347 (1915).
2 Grantham v. Jinnette, 177 N. C. 229, 98 S. E. 724 (1919). The property was

devised to the wife, at whose death the executor was to sell the property left by
her and divide the proceeds among testator's legal heirs. There were no heirs to
take under the will when wife died. Held, the widow is not the husband's heir at
common law, and property will not descend to her heirs under the statute making her the heir of the husband if he has not devised the property. A contingent remainder was created here. Allen, J., dissenting, makes the point that the devise to legal heirs was void as a remainder; this left the reversion in fee in the testator at his
death and it would pass to widow as his heir under the statute. Baugham v. Trust
Co., 181 N. C. 406, 409, 107, S. E. 431, 432 (1921) "It is true that the limitation to
the heirs of the testator is referred to in some of the cases as a remainder to the
heirs, and in others as a reversion left in the testator."
'See Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 335, 84 S. E. 347, 348 (1915) (principle recognized).
"Jenkins v. Lambeth, 172 N. C. 466, 90 S. E. 513 (1916).

'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1739.

"Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84 S. E. 347 (1915) (conveyance in contemplation of marriage to M, the intended wife, to descend to the heirs of the
body of the said M in fee simple, the issue of such marriage, and on failure of

issue to revert to the heirs of the grantor).
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effect, however, of the court's decision was to bring the case within the
doctrine, that, if by "heirs" the grantor meant "children" or those who
would be his heirs if he died at the death of the life tenant, or if in
any other way he indicated a class of remaindermen, which might dif17
fer from his heirs general, the rule would have no application.
The principal case lays down the common law rule that when the
limitation is to the heirs general of the grantor, such heirs take by descent since the grantor retained the reversion. Here the statute' 8 was
not regarded as applicable because the court apparently thought the
intention of the grantor was otherwise as to the use of the word "heirs,"' 19
and the rule under discussion was applied as a rule of property. It is
submitted that the court, in so deciding, failed to consider the grantor's
intention derived from the instrument as a whole. The conveyance
was to the grantor's only child and to the child's husband, and to the
survivor of them, then to their children, and if there were none, then
to the grantor's own right heirs. It would thus seem that she had given
up all interest in the land and her collateral heirs would be entitled
to take. Instead of availing itself of the opportunity to change the
rule to one of construction, the court preferred to follow its precedents
laid down in the wills cases, where similar limitations were under con20
sideration, and in which the rule was applied as one of property.
The North Carolina court in other decisions has inaugurated the commendable policy of disregarding the rigid technicalities of the common
law2l and has sought to give effect to the grantor's intention. 22 Since
the ancient reasons for the rule no longer exist, the rule itself should be
abolished; but if the court is going to apply it, then it should be applied
as as a rule of construction so as not to defeat the intention of the
grantor. This would be in keeping with the trend of modern au23
thority.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
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Simes, FUTURE

N. C. CODE

ANN.

INTERESTS

(1936)

§147.

(Michie, 1935) §1739.

" One could hardly interpret "heirs" as meaning children here, since the daughter was an only child.
IYelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N. C. 614, 135 S. E. 632 (1926); Note (1935)
14 N. C. L. REv. 90 (Doctrine of Worthier Title).
"Willis and Regan v. Mutual Loan and Trust Co., 183 N. C. 267, 269, 111
S. E. 163, 164 (1922) "The rigid technicalities of the common law have gradually yielded to the demand for a more rational mode of expounding deeds." Pugh
v. Allen, 179 N. C. 307, 309, 102 S. E. 394 (1920) "It is the recognized position in
this state that except when modified by some arbitrary principle of law like the
Rule in Shelly's Case, this perhaps is the only exception now prevailing, a deed
must be construed so as to effect the intention of the parties as expressed in the
entire instrument."
Boyd v. Campbell, 192 N. C. 398, 135 S. E. 121 (1926).
" 1 Simes, FUTURE INTERMSs (1936)'§147.
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Divorce-Separation.
Plaintiff separated from his wife without cause and without agreement, express or implied; however, from time to time he provided her
with money for her support. In an action for an absolute divorce on
the ground of two years of separation,1 held, divorce denied because
the mere living separate and apart for a period of two years would not
entitle either party to a divorce. The statute authorizes divorce only
where there has been a separation agreement.2 Further, the court indicated that the abandoning party may not have a divorce at all in this
state.3
A statute making separation a ground for divorce first appeared in
1907.: It required ten years of continuous separation, and a divorce under its provisions was conditioned upon there being no children born
of the marriage. 5 Divorce under this 1907 statute could be had on
application of either party, the injured party or the one at fault.0 This
was later changed by the 1919 consolidation 7 which restricted the right
to secure a divorce to the injured party.8 In 1921' the period of separation required was cut from ten years to five 9 and in 1933 from five
to two years. 10
However, in 1931, another statute had been enacted providing for
3P. L. N. C. 1933, c. 163, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1659(a), amending P. L. N. C. 1931, c. 72, provides: "Marriages may be dissolved and the parties

thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony, on application of either party, if

and when there has been a separation of husband and wife, either under a deed of
separation or otherwise, and they have lived separate and apart for two years, and
the plaintiff in the suit forg divorce has resided in this state for a period of one
year."
2For discussion of separation agreements: (1924) 2 N. C. L. REV. 192; (1926)
11 CORN. L. Q. 544; (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 315.
'Parker v. Parker, 210 N. C. 264, 186 S. E. 346 (1936).
'P . L. N. C. 1907, c. 89 amending §1561 of c. 31 of Revisal of 1905.
'P. L. N. C. 1917, c. 57 amended P. L. N. C. 1907, c. 89 by abolishing the requirement that no children shall be born of the marriage.
'Cooke v. Cooke, 164 N. C. 272, 80 S. E. 178 (1913). The defendant had previously obtained a divorce from bed and board and now the plaintiff sued for a divorce on the ground of ten years of separation. Held: there was nothing in the statute to indicate that only the injured party could sue. In the words of Justice Brown,
"After ten long years of separation, why inquire into whose fault it was, why dig
up from their graves the buried memories of broken lives?"
' C. S. 1919, c. 30, §5. The ten year separation statute which was consolidated
with the other divorce statutes provided that marriages could be dissolved and the
parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony, on application of the party
injured, where there had been a separation of husband and wife for ten years.
8
Sanderson v. Sanderson, 178 N. C. 339, 100 S. E. 590 (1919). The court distinguished Cooke v. Cooke, 164 N. C. 272, 80 S. E. 178 (1913), on the ground that
at the time the Cooke case was decided there was no restriction in the statute on
the right of either party to sue, whereas the amended statute clearly gives the
right only to the injured party. Lee v. Lee, 182 N. C. 61, 108 S. E. 352 (1921) (adhered to the Sanderson case in holding only the injured party could sue) ; Reeves
v. Reeves,
203 N. C. 792, 167 S. E. 129 (1933).
9
P. L. N. C. 1921, c. 63.
" P. L. N. C. 1933, c. 71.
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divorce after five years separation on application of either party if no
children had been born of the marriage."
This statute was not an
amendment to the old law but was in addition to the then existing statute; thus there were two different separation statutes existing at the
same time. The 1931 act was also amended in 1933 to cut the separation period from five to two years.'12
Involuntary separation of defendant caused by incarceration in the
state hospital for the insane 13 or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary' 4 has been held not to be such separation as contemplated by the
statute. In 1929 the statute was amended by allowing divorce if the separation was either voluntary or involuntary, provided involuntary separation was in consequence of a criminal act committed by the defendant
prior to such divorce proceeding.'15 However, plaintiff may not obtain
a divorce for separation where by court decree he was forced to live
17
apart from his 'wife by reason of an assault on her.1'6 Cooke v. Cooke
held that separation includes legal separation, hence a divorce from bed
and board may become a ground for absolute divorce. The court in addition pointed out that there was nothing in thd statute to indicate that
separation must be by mutual consent.
The 1931 statute, already referred to,'7 1 under which the present
suit was brought, permits either party to sue.' 8 Therein it is like the
separation statute as it existed before 1919. Therefore the court in the
principal case might have been expected to revert to its holding under
the old law, and to have permitted either the injured or the injuring
party to sue. 19 However, the court indicated that the party who has
wrongfully abandoned the other may not obtain a divorce. Probably
the court did not give the statute the meaning the legislature intended;
the new 1931 law would seem to allow divorce to either party; the only
requirement being that they live separate and apart for two years. The
P. L. N. C. 1931, c. 72.
P. L. N. C. 1933, c. 163, N. C CODa ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1659(a) also removed condition "that no children shall have been born to the marriage").
ILee v. Lee, 182 N. C. 61, 108 S. E. 352 (1921) ; (1919) 6 V. L. REV. 133;
(1919) 19 CoL L. Ray. 505.
' Sitterson v. Sitterson, 191 N. C. 319, 131 S. E. 641 (1926); Comment
(1926) 11 ST. Louis L. Rgv. 316.

" P. L. N. C. 1929, c. 6.

" Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 428, 181 S. E. 338 (1935). The court said
that an action never lies where plaintiff must base his claim in whole or in part
on a violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws of the state.
"164 N. C. 272, 80 S. E. 178 (1913).
"7 See Note 11 supra.
"Long v. Long, 206 N. C. 706, 175 S. E. 85 (1934). A separation agreement
and a property settlement had been made. The court in granting divorce to the
plaintiff, who had abandoned his wife, cited P. L. N. C. 1933, c. 163, and seemed
to base its decision on the fact that the statute allowed either party to sue. Camp-

bell v. Campbell, 207 N. C. 859, 176 S. E. 250 (1934).

"Cooke v. Cooke, 164 N. C. 272, 80 S. E. 178 (1913).
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court's addition to the statute by interpretation reaches a desirable end,
in that it prevents one party from abandoning the other without cause
and then taking advantage of his own wrong to secure a divorce.
The court further declared that to obtain a divorce under the 1931
act there must be a separation by mutual agreement, express or implied 20 The question then arises, where a party has been wrongfully
abandoned without any agreement, is that party to be denied a divorce?
The answer is that -under the older statute, passed in 1907, and already
discussed herein together with its subsequent modifications, the divorce
21
may be secured.
It is hard to see any necessity for two separation statutes, with diverse and confusing interpretations. The next legislature should pass a
single separation statute and expressly repeal the others.
JAMES A. WELLONS, JR.
Insurance-Subrogation-Right of Insured Debtor and
Creditor to Insurance Money.
X Company made a loan of $3,000 to A and took a mortgage on A's
house as security. A conveyed the house to B, who assumed the mortgage, and as additional security the X Company took out an insurance
policy on the life of B, paying the premiums therefor. Fifteen months
later B conveyed to C, and C in turn to D, each assuming the mortgage. Title to the house remained in D until the death of B two and
one-half year later. The X Company collected the insurance, kept
an amount equal to the sum due on the mortgage, and sent the mortgate to D who cancelled it of record. The administratrix of B brought
action for the surplus insurance and also asked to be subrogated to the
position of X Company as to the mortgage, contending that the estate
itself had satisfied the indebtedness. By agreement of the defendants,
X c mpany and D, the administratrix was allowed that portion of
the insurance in excess of the debt. The court refused to allow subrogation, and thus allowed D to hold the property free from the mortgage
indebtedness.'
'The words of the court are: "Where a husband and wife have lived separate
and apart from each other for two years, following a separation by mutual agreement, express or implied, their marriage may be dissolved; but where they have
lived separate and apart from each other for two years, without a previous agreement between them, neither is entitled to a divorce, under the statute, C. S.
§1659 (a)." Parker v. Parker, 210 N. C. 264, 266, 186 S. E. 346, 347 (1936). Hyder
v. Hyder, 210 N. C. 486 (1936) followed Parker v. Parker.
"John A. Livingstone, Grounds for Divorce, The Raleigh News and Observer,

September 13, 1936, at p. 3 discusses the case of Parker v. Parker. H. W. McGALLII&RD, "WOMAN AND THE LAW" c. on Divorce, which shall soon be published
by the N. C. Institute of Government.
'Miller v. Potter, 210 N. C. 268, 186 S. E. 350 (1936).
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The practice of the creditor insuring his debtor is not a thing
new or uncommon to the business world. In the usual situation the
debtor takes out insurance, naming his estate as beneficiary, and then
makes an assignment of the policy as collateral security to the creditor
"as his interest might appear," the creditor thereafter paying the premiums. Inasmuch as a contract provision is involved the courts are
2
uniform in allowing the estate of the insured the excess insurance.
Although the contract provision that the creditor take only to the extent of his interest be omitted, still the courts hold that the debtor
is entitled to the surplus.3 In the circumstance where the creditor takes
out the policy and pays the premiums, the majority of the courts seem
to say that the creditor will be allowed to retain only the insurance to
the extent of his debt, the debtor's estate getting the remainder.4 The
courts reason that the policy, above the amount of the creditor's claim, is
for the debtor's benefit and to hold otherwise the court would be supporting a wagering contract. However, it will be observed that in most of
the cases that laid down the above rule, the evidence showed either an assignment by the debtor by way of collateral security or that the creditor had procured the insurance under an agreement with the debtor.
In the absence of these factors there is good authority holding that the
creditor may retain all, reasoning that the contract is one with which
the debtor has no concern,5 this seeming to be better from the logical
standpoint. No case where the creditor took out the policy and the
debtor paid the premiums has been found, but one textwriter, at
least, intimates that the debtor would be entitled to the surplus., Such
' Benes v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 282 Ill. 236, 118 N. E. 443 (1917) (assignee
had no interest, so he was not allowed to recover anything under the policy) ; Bush
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 214 S. W. 175 (Mo. 1919) ; Freeman v. Anding, 69
S. W.
(2d) 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
8
Deal v. Hainley, 135 Mo. App. 507, 116 S. W. 1 (1909) ; VANcE,

IN sURANcE

(2d ed. 1930) §163; see Haberfield v. Mayer, 256 Pa. 151, 100 Atl. 587 (1917).
Contra: Fitzgerald v. Rawlings Implement Co., 114 Md. 470, 79 Ati. 915 (1911).
'Tateum v. Ross, 150 Mass. 440, 23 N. E. 230 (1890) ; VAxcE, loc. cit. supra
note 3; see Warnocke v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1881) (assignment as
collateral) ; Exchange Bank of Macon v. Loh, 104 Ga. 446, 31 S. E. 459 (1898)
(assignment involved) ; Lanouette v. Laplante, 67 N. H. 118, 36 Atl. 981 (1892)
(beneficiary took out policy with no interest in life of insured, but under agreement with insured, and the court allowed the estate of insured to recover entire
policy, less premiums paid by the beneficiary); Roller v. Moore's Adm'r, 86
Va. 512, 10 S. E. 241 (1889) (held: assignee of insurance policy had no insurable
interest above the debt).
5 Grant's Adm'rs v. Kline; 115 Pa. 618, 9 Atl. 150 (1887) (insurance did not
occupy the position of collateral security) ; Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223, 22
Atl. 865 (1891); VANcE, loc. cit. supra note 3; see Amick v. Butler, 111 Ind.
578, 12 N. E. 518 (1887) (assignment with agreement to reassign upon payment
of debt, this condition not being met) ; Fitzgerald v. Rawlings Implement Co.,
114 Ind. 470, 79 Atl. 915 (1911) (assignment, but provided that such was not
to secure any indebtedness).
'.MAY, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1891) §459(a).
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a view seems to be in line with sound reasoning. The abandonment by
the defendants in the principal case of their claim to the money not
necessary to the satisfaction of the mortgage, puts them in the position of accepting the majority view.
The principal problem before the court involved subrogation. This
doctrine is generally said to presuppose an existing indebtedness, and
can only be invoked by one under liability.' Such a requirement was met
in the instant case by an assumption of the mortgage by B's grantee,
a principal-surety relationship arising.8 In addition to the above, the
party seeking to invoke subrogation must have paid the debt.0 This
prerequisite was not met since the facts of the case as stated in the
court's decision indicate that B contributed nothing towards the insurance premiums. No right to subrogation could be invoked other
than on this score.
However, under the facts as found by the referee, and to which
no exceptions were filed, there appears to be an important omission in
the opinion of the Supreme Court; namely, that although X company
took out the policy, and paid the premiums, it was done with the insured's money, he having become liable for the premiums when he assumed the mortgage given by A to X Company.' 0
But, with the addition of these facts, can it be said that the money
In the
of plaintiff's intestate satisfied the mortgage indebtedness?
recent case of Russel v. Owen" the beneficiary was surety for the
insured upon an obligation secured by an assignment of the policy and
a deed of trust. However, this policy, in fact, was not taken out on behalf of the beneficiary, but to secure the insurance company, it being
the creditor. On the death of the insured the proceeds of the insurance were used in satisfying the obligation. The beneficiary brought
an action to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor in the deed of
trust and the court allowed her claim. The court reasoned that the
beneficiary's interest became vested on the death of the insured and
thus the beneficiary's money paid the obligation for which she was
surety. The result reached is apparently in line with the conclusion
reached by two other states. 12 But the decision has been criticized vigor71 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY

(3d ed 1905) §363.

8 1 BRANDT, op. cit. supra note 7, §333; see (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rsv'. 337 for

a discussion of the problem of whether the mortgagor becomes a surety to the
mortagee, when the mortgage is assumed by the grantee.
91 BRANDy, op. cit. supra note 7, §332.
1 Record on Appeal 35, Miller v. Potter, 210 N. C. 268, 186 S. E. 350 (1936).
"203 N. C. 262, 165 S.E. 687 (1932).
Barbin v. Moore, 85 N. H. 362, 159 Atl. 409 (1932) (the insurance company was not the creditor) ; Katz v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 127 Ohio St. 531, 191 N. E.
782 (1934) (promisory notes involved, with no mortgage security); see Smith
v. Wells, 72 Ind. App. 29, 122 N. E. 334 (1919) (subrogation allowed due to
prior agreement).
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3

ously.' due to its defeat of the evident intention of the insured, and at
least one state has refused to override this intention. 14 In order to get a
result in the principal case similar to the result reached above one assumption must be made; namely, that where a creditor takes out insurance on the debtor's life as security for his obligation, with the debtor
paying the premiums, having in fact been under a liability to so do,
the debtor's estate should be in substantially the same position as the
beneficiary where a debtor takes out a policy of insurance, naming a
beneficiary, and later assigns such policy to the creditor as collateral security for his obligation.
From the practical aspect of the principal case there seems to be no
great dissimilarity between the two arrangements. The court had before
it a very "close case," but subrogation "was invented to do substantial
justice between the parties."' 5 Therefore, since the deceased in effect
has paid the premiums, and the creditor has been satisfied, the deceased's
estate should receive the product of the insurance, namely, the satisfied
mortgage.
J. WILLIAM COPELAND.

Parent and Child-Child's Right to Sue Parent for Support.
An infant of six years, by a next friend, instituted an action against
her father for support and maintenance.' The parents of this minor
child bad been divorced and the custody awarded to the mother. The
court held for the plaintiff.
The usual means of enforcing the obligation of a parent to support
the child is an action by a third party against the parent for the value
of necessaries furnished the child, or a decree for support of the child
in a divorce suit, or criminal proceedings. 2 In allowing the child to sue
its parent directly, the usual form of action being otherwise, the North
Carolina court has shown itself most liberal in the treatment of the parent and child relationship.
At common law id England the duty of a parent to support his child was considered merely moral, and neither a suit
by the child for support nor an action by a third party for necessaries
was allowed.3 In a great many of our jurisdictions the duty has been
(1933) 11 N. C.L. Rv.169.
Kash Ex'r v. Kash, 260 Ky. 508, 86 S. W. (2d) 273 (1935); Berger v.
Berger, 264 Ky. 225, 94 S.W. (2d) 618 (1936).
(1936) 14 N. C. L. REv. 295, 296.
'

'Green v. Green, 210 N. C.147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936).
'Note (1920) 7 A. L. R.1277.
'Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 481 (1840) ; Shelton v.Springett, 11 C. B.
452 (1851) ; Bazeley v. Forder, L. R. 3 Q. B. 559 (1868).
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called legal, 4 but in spite of this language of the courts, a direct action
by the child has commonly been denied.5 Special circumstances have
given rise to attempted actions which may be grouped under four headings: (1) actions brought under statutory provisions; (2) actions by
illegitimate children; (3) actions on contracts providing for the child's
support; (4) actions after a divorce or separation of the child's parents.
(1) Under the statutory provisions, many states provide for criminal prosecution for non-support and abandonment,0 but in such cases
the proceeding is instituted by the state and not by the child. The most
that the child can do is to complain to the proper authorities and hope
that the parent will be coerced into providing for it. It is only under the
so-called "poor laws" that the indigent child has been allowed to sue
7
in its own name.
(2) While at common law the putative father was under no legal
obligation to support his illegitimate child,8 the North Carolina court
in Sanders v. Sanders9 said, "There is a natural obligation to support
even illegitimate children which the law not only recognizes, but enforces." Cases are found in the reports that bear out this dictum, and
there is no doubt that in North Carolina since the decision in the principal case an illegitimate child may sue for support. 10 Nebraska and
'Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084 (1902) ;
Worthingham v. Worthingham, 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S. W. 443 (1923);
ScHouLER, DomESTic RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) §781.
'Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (1891). A seventeen year old daughter's
petition in equity against her father for support was dismissed because by the
common law of England this obligation was without legal sanction, and there
was no Missouri statute to compel the father to support her. A later Missouri
case, Glaze v. Hart, 225 Mo. App, 1205, 36 S.W. (2d) 684 (1931), held that
although the father might be criminally liable for failure to perform his duty
and civilly liable to one who furnishes necessaries to his child, still
the child himself would not -,be permitted to sue. Matter og Ryder, 11
Paige 185 (N. Y. 1844) ; Allings, v. Allings, 52 N. J.Eq. 92, 27 AtI. 655 (1893);
In re Ganey 93 N. J.Eq. 389, 116 Atl. 19 (1922).
ON. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§4448, 4449, 4450, 4450(a).
7CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) §206 (provides that it is the duty of the f ather, the mother, and the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work to maintain such person to the extent of their ability) ; Paxton v. Paxton, 150 Cal. 667, 89 Pac. 1083 (1907) (§206 imposes a legal obligation on
parents to support an invalid adult child enforceable by the child in a suit in equity) ;
Tuller v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. 242, 10 P. (2d) 43 (1932) (complaint by a
child as a '1poor person" against her father for non-support held not demurrable for failure to join the mother). Contra: Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss.
140, 83 So. 1259 (1919) (bill filed by an abandoned child to require sufficient support could not be entertained, notwithstanding a statute requiring certain relatives
to support pauper members of the family).
s Cameron v. Baker, 1 C. & P. 268, 12 Ecl. 161 (1824) ; Furillio v. Crowther, 7
D. & R. 612, 16 El. 302 (1826) ; Hard's Case, 2 Salk. 427 (1795).
"167 N. C. 316, 319, 83 S.E.490, 491 (1924).
"oSee Burton v. Belvin, 142 N. C. 151, 153, 55 S.E. 71, 72 (1926) ; Kimborough
v. Davis, 16 N. C. 71, 75 (1827) ; Hyatt v. ivicCoy, 195 N. C. 762, 143 S.E. 518
(1928).
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Kansas have also ruled on this question and allow these unfortunates
to sue directly. 11
(3) Pending divorce or separation, contracts are sometimes made
between the parents for the support and education of the children that
will be affected by their parting. These contracts are often made a
part of the final decree of divorce or separation, but in no case have
the children been allowed to sue the parent on the contract. The courts
have ruled that the other parent is the proper party or must be joined
2
in the bringing of the action.'
(4) After a divorce or a deed of separation, a majority of the
states hold that a father remains liable for the support of his children
on the ground that he owes both the children and society an obligation
that even loss of custody and right to the child's services do not dissolve. In the following four situations he has been held liable: (a)
where the divorce decree makes no provision for the child's custody
or support ;13 (b) where the custody of the child is awarded to the
mother, but no provision is made for its support ;14 (c) where the decree awards the custody of the child to the mother with sums to be
paid by the father for support, but the provision for the child becomes
insufficient. In such a case, upon the opening of the former decree, further compensation may be allowed ;15 (d) where there is neither a decree of divorce nor a deed of separation, but the parents are living
separate and apart. 1'
Admitting that the father is under a duty to support the child in
the above four instances, will the child be allowed to enforce directly
17
the obligation? The courts in the pasf have answered in the negative.
"Craig v. Shea, 102 Neb. 575, 168 N. W. 135 (1918)

(there being no pro-

vision allowing bastardy proceeding to be brought by a married woman, and no

other remedy being afforded except criminal prosecution, the illegitimate child,
by its next friend, might maintain an action in equity against its putative father
to declare its status and recover support and maintenance) ; Doughty v. Engler,
112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).
"Kendall v. Kendall, 200 App. Div. 702, 193 N. Y. Supp. 658 (1922) ; Cawthon v. Jones, 240 Ky. 380, 42 S. W. (2d) 498 (1931).
Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292, 9 At. 623 (1887).
"Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn. 56, 105 N. W. 483 (1906) ; Evans v. Evans,
125 Tenn. 112, 140 S. W . 745 (1911).
Graham v. Graham, 38 Colo. 453, 88 Pac. 852 (1906).
v. Jacobs, 136 Minn. 190, 161 N. W. 525 (1917).
Sikes v. Sikes, 158 Ga. 406, 123 S. E. 694 (1924) ; Hooten v. Hooten, 168
Ga. 86, 147 S. E. 373 (1929) ; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 40 S. W.
(2d) 46 (1927). In Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78
L. ed. 269 (1933) the parents were divorced in Georgia and in the same proceedings
a lump sum for the child's maintenance and education was awarded.
This
sum was paid by the father. About a year later the child, residing in South
Carolina, attached some of her father's property in that state and sued for
additional money to enable her to educate 'herself. It was held by the United
States Supreme Court that the Georgia decree fixing permanent alimony was
binding on the child though it was not a party to the suit and was not repre'Jacobs
'
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These courts have held that such a proceeding would be contrary to
public policy in that it would be detrimental to the integrity of the
home, break the home ties, open the doors of the courts for actions by
intractable children. Therefore, the recent North Carolina decision in
allowing the child of divorced parents to sue for support sets a new
landmark.18 Would not public policy be best subserved by following
this decision and awarding relief to the child? This is the most direct
means of enforcing the parent's obligation. Such an action would
not be detrimental to the integrity of the home as the home has already
been disrupted by divorce, separation or abandonment.
WILLIAM THORNTON WHITSETT.

Public Utilities-Public Service Commissions-Power to Require
Extensions-Dedication of Property by Public Utilities.
Pursuant to a joint resolution of the Senate and House,1 the
Georgia Public Service Commission ordered the Georgia Power Co.
to supply the town of Andersonville with electricity. The Power Co.
obtained an injunction against the enforcement of the order, and the
Commission appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. Judgment
was reversed and the injunction dissolved. It appears from the facts
that the Power Co., operating under a general charter right to supply
electricity to cities and towns throughout the state, had obtained
franchises to serve several cities around Andersonville, the nearest
being about ten miles away, and that its transmission lines ran within
sented by a guardian ad litem. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis,
held that the appearance of both parents in the Georgia divorce action gave that
court complete jurisdiction over the marriage status and, as an incident, power
to determine the extent of the father's obligation to support the child, though
the child was residing in another state when the divorce judgment was entered. The Court held the Georgia decree binding on other states because of the
full faith and credit clause. U. S. CONsT. ART. IV, §1. Mr. Justice Stone,
dissenting, contended that it should be no answer to this suit by the child that at
some earlier time some provision for it had been made which was no longer
available or adequate. He believed that the Georgia court had tied its own hands
and 'its own policy, but should not at the same time be permitted to prescribe
that policy for other states i which the child might happen to live. Hansberger v.
Hansberger, 185 S. E. 810 (Ga. 1936) ; Bedrick v. Bedrick, 151 Misc. 4, 270 N. Y.
Supp. 566 (1933) (parents separated but not by legal decree) ; Baker v. Baker,
169 Tenn. 589, 89 S. W. (2d) 763 (1935).
'Singleton v. Singleton, 217 Ky. 38, 288 S. W, 1029 (1926) (demurrer to
divorced mother's plea for additional allowance for children sustained.
Children intervened and their plea for additional allowance granted); Barrett v.
Barrett, 39 P. (2d) 621 (Ariz. 1934) (knowledge of child that divorce decree
had awarded custody of children to mother and imposed the duty of
support upon her held not to deprive child of right to maintain his
action against the father for reimbursement for necessaries furnished by him when
the mother was incapable of supporting the children).
'Georgia Acts of 1935, p. 1248. It was not contended that this resolution enlarged in any way the powers of the Commission.
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sixty-nine feet of the city limits of Andersonville. The city had applied for service and had offered the Power Co. an exclusive franchise.
Although a showing was made of the costs of extending the service
and the expected revenue, the company based its case not upon unreasonableness of the order,2 but upon the proposition that its charter right imposed no duty to serve, and therefore the Commission's order amounted to a taking of property without due process of law. The
court, however, held that the statute giving the Commission power to
'crequire ...public service companies under its supervision to establish and maintain such public services and facilities as may be reasonable and just"3 was broad enough to include extensions into new
territory within that covered by the charter right, and that the exercise
of this power was not unconstitutional because the Power Co. had impliedly dedicated its property to the service of Andersonville in that
its existing services and lines were so close by. 4
This holding presents two fundamental questions. First, under
such a statute can a public service commission require any reasonable
and profitable extension within the charter right territory?5 Second,
can there be a dedication of property to the public service in any part of
the charter right territory other than by an actual entering of the
region in question? Much confusion exists in the law on these propositions. The court in the instant case cited as authority for the proposition
that extensions into new territory may be ordered cases dealing with
discontinuance of existing services,0 and with discrimination between
customers 7 without due regard for their exact holdings. Another distinction which should be made is between the present case and those concerning extensions ordered within the corporate limits of a city or town
from which the utility has accepted an exclusive franchise. By accepting
the franchise the utility pre-empts the territory and binds itself to supply
Where the order is unreasonable and confiscatory in that -the revenues will
not be sufficient to pay a fair return on the investment, the courts are in accord
that relief will be granted. Marr v. City of Glendale, 40 Cal. App. 748, 181 Pac.
671 (1919); Public Service Comm. of Md. v. Brooklyn and Curtis Bay Light
and Water Co., 122 Md. 612, 90 A.tl. 89 (1914); Ladner v. Miss. Public Utili-

ties3 Co., 158 Miss. 678, 131 S.E. 78 (1930).
GEORGIA CODE (1933) §§93-307.

'Georgia Public Service Comm. v. Georgia Power Co., 186 S. E. 839 (Ga.,
1936).
'No case was found requiring extensions beyond the charter or franchise
limits.
'Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. N. C. Corp. Comm., 206 U. S. 1, 27
Sup. Ct. 585, 51 L. ed. 398 (1907); N. C. Public Service Co. v. So. Power
Co., 263 U. S. 508, 44 Sup. Ct. 164, 68 L. ed. 413 (1924) aff'g 282 Fed. 837 (1922) ;
Salisbury and Spencer Ry. Co. v. So. Power Co., 179 N. C. 18, 101 S E. 593 (1919).
'N. C. Public Service CO. v. So. Power Co., 263 U. S. 508, 44 Sup. Ct.
164, 68 L. ed. 413 (1924); Smith v. Ky. Utilities Co., 233 Ky. 68, 24 S. W.
(2d) 928 (1930) ; Salisbury and Spencer Ry. Co. v. So. Power Co., 179 N. C.
18, 101 S.E. 593 (1919).
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-all parts of the city subject, as usual, to the tests of reasonableness and
profitableness. The Supreme Court of the United States has twice held
such an order constitutional. 8 But these cases are not authority where
a general charter right covering a large area is involved, and the question
remains whether accepting such a charter right alone imposes a duty to
serve.
Cases directly on this point are remarkably few. In Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Washington Railroad and Navigation Co.9 the Supreme Court held that the I. C. C. could not require
a railroad to build a line through new territory connecting existing lines.
In so holding the court said: "Much is made of the circumstance that,
when the complaint was filed, the company had a charter under which
it was authorized to build a line on the location of that which the order describes. The possession of the franchise' 0 is said to give rise to
an implied agreement to serve the district. . . . But authority to build
the line if the company were so minded, involved no commitment to
construct it. Though by appropriate legislation the state might forfeit
the charter for non-user, the continued existence of the franchise
imposed no obligation to exercise the charter power." This statement
clearly rules on the first proposition presented by the present case,
and, the question being one of constitutionality, eliminates as authority any state holdings which allege such a duty."
This leaves for consideration only the second proposition for which
there is also remarkably little authority. Unfortunately the OregonWashington case leaves this question wide open. There may be, as is
contended by the court in the instant case, an implication from certain
passages in that case' 2 that there can be an implied dedication other
than an actual entering, but in view of the final holding these same
'N. Y. ex rel. N. Y. and Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 38 Sup. Ct.
122, 62 L. ed. 337 (1917) ; N. Y. ex rel. Woodhaven Gaslight Co. v. Public Service
Comm. of N. Y., 269 U. S. 244, 46 Sup. Ct. 83, 70 L. ed. 225 (1925). The few
state courts which have ruled on this point are all in accord. Lukrawka v. Spring
Valley Water Co., 196 Cal. 318, 146 Pac. 40 (1916) ; People ex rel. Woodhaven
Gaslight Co. v. Nixon, 203 App. Div. 369, 196 N. Y. S. 623 (1922) ; Okla. Gas and
Electric Co. v. State, 87 Okla. 174, 209 Pac. 777 (1922).

'288 U. S. 14, 53 Sup. Ct. 266, 77 L. ed. 588 (1932).

"'Le. the general charter right. The Oregon-Washington had no exclusive
franchise.
'Root v. New Britain Gaslight Co., 91 Conn. 134, 99 Atl. 559 (1916) ; Philadelphia Rural Transit Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Pa., 103 Pa. Super. 256,
158 Atl. 589 (1931).
' "We... think the -power granted by par. 21 is confined to extensions within
the undertaking of the carrier to serve and cannot be extended to embrace the
building of what is essentially a new line to reach new territory." "Whether the
railroad held itself out to serve the region in question must be decided in the
light of all the facts. The record demonstrates that the territory to be traversed
was one the company had neither actually nor impliedly agreed -to serve with
transportation facilities." 288 U. S. 14, 40, 43, 56 Sup. Ct. 266, 274, 275, 77 L. ed.

588, 604, 605 (1932).
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passages could just as easily be interpreted to mean that something
more than nearness of existing service to the new region is required.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Ozark Power and Water Co. v. Public Service Commission of Mo. 13

sustained an order of

the Commission requiring an extension under circumstances very
similar to those in the instant case, but there existed the additional
fact that the company's agents had canvassed the territory for prospective customers and had induced several persons to have their
houses wired in contemplation of receiving the service. It would seem
that some such positive act on the part of the company should be required before an implied dedication is inferred. The few state courts
which deny the power of public service comminsions to require extensions do not consider the question of implied dedication, but base their
holdings solely upon the proposition contended for by the Power Co.
in the present case, that the right carries no duty.' 4 The question of implied dedication will necessarily remain unanswered until the Supreme
Court of the United States rules squarely on the point.
JAMES W. DOR.SEY.
Taxation-Constitutional Law-State Use Tax.
A recent North Carolina statute1 provides that every purchaser
of a motor vehicle for use in North Carolina must pay a use tax of
three per cent of the purchase price. If the purchaser has paid the North
Carolina sales tax 2 the amount exacted under this statute is refunded.
The plaintiff, a resident of North Carolina, purchased an automobile in Virginia for use in North Carolina. The Commissioner of
Revenue refused to issue him a license until he paid the tax imposed
by the above statute. The plaintiff paid the tax under protest and sued
to recover it contending that the statute under which it was collected
was unconstitutional in that it burdened interstate commerce, was
discriminatory, and further that it violated the provision of the State
Constitution which requires all taxes to be by a uniform rule. The
statute was held to violate neither the Federal nor the State Constitution.3
One of the primary objections urged against a retail sales tax is
that it encourages out of state purchases. To remedy this evil with" 287 Mo. 522, 229 S. W. 782 (1921).
"Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Cal., 173 Cal. 577,

160 Pac. 828 (1916); Towers v. United Railways of Baltimore, 126 Md. 478,
95 Atl. 170 (1915); Mays v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 75 S. C. 455, 56 S. E. 30
(1906).
1N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880(156)e(13) ; see Statutory Changes in
North Carolinain 1935 (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 420.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880(156)e(12).
Powell v. Maxwell, Comm'r. of Revenue, 210 N. C. 211, 186 S. E. 326 (1936).
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out conflicting with the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution
has proved to be an aggravating problem in state legislation. The above
statute represents an attempt by North Carolina to eliminate evasion
of its sales tax by those who go outside the state to purchase automobiles.
In 1935 several states, having a retail sales tax, made an attempt to
solve this problem of tax evasion by adopting laws which taxed the
use of personal property within their bounds. 4 Although North Carolina's use tax statute5 is more restricted in its application than the
more general use tax statutes, 6 the same constitutional questions are involved. While a state cannot burden interstate commerce,7 it is well
settled that a state may levy a tax upon the use of property within
the state.8 Since the automobile in the principal case had come to
rest within the state it was no longer a part of interstate commerce and
therefore the tax could not have been a burden upon interstate commerce.
Statutes9 similar to the one in the principal case have been held not
to be discriminatory since every purchaser pays the same amount of
tax. The fact that the taxes are levied under different statutes makes
no difference. Related statutes must be construed in conjunction with
the one assailed and final effect rather than form made the test of constitutionality. A state may distribute its tax burden as it sees fit if
the result taken in its totality is within the state's Constitutional
4
In 1935 the following states enacted statutes taxing the use of personal
property within their bounds. CAl. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1935) Act 8495a p.
2018; 01o
CODE: (Baldwin, Supp. 1936) §5546-26; OKLA. SEss. LAws (Harlow,
1935) Acr. 7, c. 66 §4 (j) ; WAsH. LAWS (1935) Title 4, c. 180 n 726.

'See Note 1, supra.
'See Note 4, supra.
'Kansas Southern Ry. v. Kaw Valley Dist., 233 U. S. 75, 34 Sup. Ct. 564, 58
L. ed. 857 (1914) ; Helson v. Commonwealth of Ky., 279 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct.
279, 73 L. ed. 683 (1929) ; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497, 79
L. ed. 1032 (1935).
'Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 606, 65 L. ed.
1139 (1921); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 49 Sup. Ct. 188, 73
L. ed. 475 (1929) ; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631,
76 L. ed. 1232 (1932); Eastern Air Transport Inc. v. S. C. Tax Comm., 285
U. S. 147, 52 Sup. Ct. 340, 76 L. ed. 673 (1932); Edleman v. Boeing Air
Transport Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 591, 77 L. ed. 1155 (1933) ; Nashville
Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed. 730 (1933) ; Piper
v. Bingaman, 12 F. Supp. 755 (D. N. M. 1935) ; Harper v. England, 168 So. 403
(Fla. 1936).

'Acrs

OF

S. C. (1930) p. 1390.

This statute provides for a license tax of

six cents per gallon upon every person storing or using gasoline within the state.
However, the tax is not applicable if the gasoline has been purchased from a
S. C. dealer who has paid a -tax to deal in gasoline equivalent to the use tax.

WASH. LAws (1935) Title 4, c. 180n. 726. This statute provides for a tax
upon the use of personal property within the state, but does not apply if the purchaser has paid a sales tax.
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power.1 0 The North Carolina use tax 1 does not have the ten dollar maximum which is contained in the retail sales tax.12 However,
the Commissioner of Revenue construed the two to have the same maximum. This power was given to him in the revenue act and such construction is prima facie correct.' 3 Therefore the North Carolina Use
Tax statute cannot be assailed as discriminatory.
There are court decisions to the effect that a use tax is not a
property tax and thus not subject to the uniformity provisions of the
state constitutions. 14 The North Carolina court has held that a use
tax is not a property tax, 15 and while under our court decisions this
would not necessarily exempt it from the uniformity rule, the effect of
the rule is only to require uniformity within each valid classification
made by the legislature. 16 Many practical distinctions between the two
types of taxes suggest themselves. A property tax is collected annually
while a use tax is collected only once. A property tax is due on a certain date while a use tax is not. And finally the manner of collecting the
two is different.1 7
Thus it seems that the principal case is sound both from a legal
and practical standpoint. This is a progressive attempt on the part of
the state to meet a practical problem in a practical way. It is not an
attempt by the state to erect a barrier to interstate commerce, but
rather an effort by the state to secure the revenue which it justly deserves.
CLARENCE W. GRIFFIN.
Torts-Contributory Negligence of Minors-Question
for Court or Jury.
Plaintiff, a boy of 12, while roller skating was injured when hit by
defendant's negligently driven car. He testified that he was unable to
stop when warned of the approaching vehicle by his playmates and that
he "thought that he could make it but missed." He further testified that
he realized that he ought not to have gone into the street. The judge
"Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631, 76 L. ed. 1232
(1932) ; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henniford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14 (1935).
"See Note 1, supra.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880 (156)e(12).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880 (191). The construction of a statute by its administrative officer carries great weight in the interpretation by a
court. Cannon v. Maxwell, 205 N. C. 420, 171 S. E. 624 (1933); People Park
Reservoir Co. v. Hinderlider, 57 P. (2d) 894 (Colo. 1936).
"Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henniford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14 (1935).
"Stedman v. Winston-Salem, 204 N. C. 203, 167 S. E. 813 (1933),
holding that tangible personal property is one thing and the use thereof another,
and one may be taxed and the other exempt.
"'Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930).
" Forster, Constitutionality of California Use Tax (1936) 9 So. CALin. L.
Rsv. 261.
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submitted the case to the jury on the issue of contributory negligence
and there was a verdict for the plaintiff. Affirmed.'
Had the acts of minor plaintiff been those of an adult, defendant
would have been entitled to a nonsuit on the ground that plaintiff by his'
2
own evidence conclusively established contributory negligence.
Would the North Carolina court ever hold as a matter of law that a
minor is guilty of contributory negligence?
Two tests are used in determining an infant's capacity for exercising
care and his consequent liability for negligence. 3 One is the Subjective
test and uses as its criterion the psychological rather than chronological
age of the child. In applying this test the court takes into consideration
the age, knowledge, experience, and discretion of the particular child.
This is the minority view, but there is a growing tendency on the part
4
of courts to employ it as the more rational solution to the problem.
The second test is commonly called the Objective, and uses the child's
calendar age as a basis for determining his capacity, i.e. by reference
to the average child of the same age. 5 The weakness of this test is its
failure to weigh the individual differences, both mental and physical,
apparent in the makeup of children. What has been thought of as a
third test is the criminal law analogy 6 by which there is a conclusive
"Hollingsworth v. Burns, 210 N. C. 40, 185 S. E. 476 (1936).
'Nowell v. Basnight, 185 N. C. 142, 116 S. E. 87 (1923) ; Lunsford v. Manufacturing Co., 195 N. C. 510, 146 S. E. 129 (1928) ; Scott v. Telegraph Co., 198 N. C.
795, 153 S.E. 413 (1930). For further treatment of contributory negligence see
Bohlen, Contributory Negligenwe (1908) 21 HARv. L. RaV. 233.
§464(2); BURICK, TORTS (4th ed. 1926) §65
3REsTATEmENT, TORTS (1934)
(462) ; 2 CooLEY-, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) §§818-822; SALMOND, TORTS (6th ed. 1924)
§9(4).
'See Central R. R. and Banking Co. v. Ryles, 87 Ga. 491, 495, 13 S.E. 584,
585 (1891). The court said, "The better rule would be for the jury to deal with
each case upon its own facts, unhampered by presumptions of law either for or
against the competency of the child." Berdos v. Tremont and Suffolk Mills, 209
Mass. 489, 494, 95 N. E. 876, 878 (1911). Rugg, C. J. speaking for the court,
"There is no hard and fast rule that at any particular age a minor is presumed to
comprehend risks or to be capable of negligence .... But the sounder doctrine
seems to be that age is an important though not decisive factor in determining
capacity, and that the decision of that question is not helped or hampered by any
legal presumption." Camardo v. New York State Rys., 247 N. Y. 111, 116, 159
N. E. 879, 880 (1928). Lehman, J.stated, "The law does not disregard variations
in capacity among children of the same age, and does not arbitrarily fix an age
at which the duty to exercise some care begins or an age at which an infant must
exercise the same care as an adult."
IWashington R. R. Co. v. State, 153 Md. 119, 137 AtI. 484 (1927) (a child
cannot be required to exercise any higher degree of care than might be expected
of one of similar age) ; Rasmussen v. Whipple, 211 Mass. 546, 98 N. E. 592 (1912)
(boy's conduct must be measured by that of an ordinary, prudent boy of the same
age).
IRenaldi v. Lengar Structural Co., 97 N. J. L. 162, 117 Atl. 42 (1922). The
court held that a child of very tender years was incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but stated that the child's capacity, etc. is the test for
more mature children. Wells v. McNutt, 136 Tenn. 274, 189 S. W. 365 (1916)
(child under seven presumed incapable of contributory negligence but not conclusively so) ; Von Sax v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 Pac. 62 (1923). A child of
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presumption of incapacity for children under seven, a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for children between the ages of seven and
fourteen, and a presumption of capacity for those over fourteen. This
is really a rule of law as to children under seven, but, as to children
between seven and fourteen, it is still necessary to use either the Subjective or the Objective test in order to rebut the presumption of incapacity.
In the first North Carolina case on this question, 7 the court followed
the Subjective test as expounded by the United States Supreme Court
in 1873, which declared that, "An infant of tender years is not held to
the same degree of discretion as that of an adult, and the degree depends
upon its age and knowledge. The caution required is according to the
maturity and capacity of the child."'8 The North Carolina court has
followed this doctrine in most of its decisions. 9 But in certain cases
the court has followed the criminal law analogy,10 and in others has unconsciously attempted to blend the two doctrines.:" Their contrariety is
apparent. Such confusion was present in the instant case as the judge
charged the jury that, "If the boy had been the age of fourteen, or an
adult, the court would instruct you as a matter of law that he was guilty
five was held incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Contra:
Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. Co., 93 Vt. 132, 106 Atl. 682, 685 (1919). In
commenting on the analogy to the rule involving criminal conduct of infants the
court said, "There is little, if any, support for the rule by the analogy. Capacity
to commit crime, involving, as it does, discretion to understand the nature and
illegality of the particular act constituting the crime, is one thing, and capacity to
care for one's personal safety is another and quite a different thing.... While the
rule has the merit of simplicity, it is purely arbitrary, and lacks the sanction of
reason and experience."
7Manly v. R. R., 74 N. C. 655 (1876).
'See Washington and Georgetown R. R. v. Gladman, 15 Wall 401 (U. S.), 21.
L. ed. 114, 116.
' Murray v. R. and D. R. R., 93 N. C. 92 (1885) ; Alexander v. Statesville, 165
N. C. 527, 81 S. E. 763 (1914) ; Fry v. Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354
(1922); Ghorly v. R. R., 189 N. C. 634, 127 S.E. 634 (1925) ; Hoggard v. R. R.,
194 N. C. 256, 139 S.E. 372 (1927) ; Brown v. R. R., 195 N. C. 699, 143, S. E. 536
(1928) ; Tart v. R. R., 202 N. C. 52, 161 S. E. 720 (1931) ; Morris v. Sprott, 207
N. C. 358, 177 S. E. 13 (1934).
"Bottoms v. R. R., 114 N. C. 699, 19 S. E. 730 (1894) (child of twenty-two
months held incapable of negligence as a matter of law) ; Ashby v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 172 N. C. 98, 89 S. E. 1059 (1916) (negligence could not be attributed to
a boy of eight); Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 699, 130 S. E.
638 (1925) (child of four incapable of negligence as a matter of law).
"Rolin v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. C. 300, 53 S.E. 891 (1906). The court stated that
a child under twelve was presumed to be incapable of understanding and appreciating dangers from a negligent act, but that contributory negligence on the part of
a child is to be measured by 'his age and ability to discern and appreciate the circumstances of danger. Caudle v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N. C. 404, 163 S.E.
122 (1931) A prima facie presumption exists that an infant between the ages of
seven and fourteen is incapable of contributory negligence, but the presumption
may be overcome. However the court further stated that the test in determining
whether a child is contributorily negligent is whether it acted as a child of its age,
capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience would ordinarily have acted under
similar circumstances.
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of contributory negligence."' 12 That the plaintiff's capacity to understand the situation and appreciate its dangers was evident to the trial
judge is shown by the admission in his charge that had the child been
two years older a nonsuit would have been ordered. By arbitrarily setting an age of presumptive capacity the trial court had deviated in part
from the Subjective test. When a child's capacity to appreciate the
circumstances is obvious, why should a rebuttable presumption of incapacity keep the judge from directing a verdict for the defendant?
Had the trial court used the criminal law analogy, there was nothing to
prevent a directed verdict for the defendant as the presumption of
incapacity was rebutted by the child's obvious appreciation of his own
danger. Though there has never been a case in North Carolina where
a child under fourteen has been held guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law, 13 there seems to be no reason why it should not be
so held where the circumstances admit of but one inference. In this
same type of case there is good authority in other jurisdictions holding
binding instructions for the defendant proper "where reasonable minds
14
cannot differ."'
In most cases a blending of the criminal law analogy with the Subjective test does not hamper the trial court's effectiveness in applying
the latter test, but in cases like the instant one where the child's capacity
is apparent, the presumption seemed to prevent the court's deciding the
case solely upon the infant's knowledge, maturity, and discretion.
It seems that the best solution to this difficult problem would be to
use the Subjective test in its "pure form." It is true this plan would
offer no definite standard of measurement, yet its adoption would prevent the arising of the confusion manifest in the principal case. Where
any doubt existed as to the child's capacity, the question would be left to
the jury, but where the evidence was clear that the child was either
capable or incapable, the question would be rightfully one for the judge's

discretion.

HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.

"Hollingsworth v. Burns, 210 N. C. 40, 44, 185 S. E. 476, 478 (1936).
'Two cases hold children guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
but on the theory that the question is always one for the court and that to submit
it to a jury would cause a shifting standard. Baker v. Seaboard Airline Co., 150
N. C. 562, 64 S.E. 506 (1909) ; Foard v. Tidewater Power Co., 170 N. C. 48, 86
S. E. 804 (1915). These two cases stand alone and are criticized in Fry v. Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 290, 111 S. E. 354, 359 (1922).
14See Moeller v. United Rys., 13 Mo. App. 168, 112 S.W. 714, 716 (1908). A
boy of twelve sued for personal injuries and the court said, "The question is one
for the jury, unless the only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence is that he was guilty of contributory negligence." In Payne v. Blevius,
280 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 4th. 1922) the court held that the determination of whether
a thirteen year old boy was guilty of contributory negligence 'was a question for
the court where the evidence admits of but one conclusion and the fact is one
about which reasonable minds cannot differ. Scherer v. Wood, 19 Ohio App,
381 (1924) (when the age of the child admits of no doubt as to its capacity to
avoid danger, the court will decide the question as a matter of law).
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Trusts-Principal and Income-Apportionment of Income from Part
of Estate Used to Pay Legacies, Debts and Costs of Administration.
Action by a testamentary trustee to determine how properly to dispose of $11,946.13, income derived during the entire period of administration from that portion of the estate used to pay specific legacies, debts
and costs of administration. Under the terms of the trust the income
was to be paid to the testator's children and their issue during their lives,
remainder over to members of a class. Held, the money in question
was payable as income to the life tenants and not to corpus for the
benefit of remaindermen.'
This is a case of first impression in North Carolina. Elsewhere,
two rules, the English rule and the Massachusetts rule, have been developed to govern the trustee in meeting the problem.2 The English
rule, with which Connecticut,3 Maryland, 4 New Hampshire, 5 New Jersey0 and the Restatement of Trusts7 are in accord, was originally

formulated in the case of Alihusen v. Whittell,8 as follows: "But the
executors, when they have dealt -with the estate, will be taken by the
Court as having applied in payment of debts such a portion of the fund
as, together with the income of that portion for one year, was necessary
for the payment of the debts. .

.

. It is clear that the tenant for life

ought not to have the income arising from what is wanted for the payment of debts, because that never becomes residue in any way whatever." That is to say,9 "a life owner of a testator's estate must only
receive income from that portion of the capital which forms the net, or
more correctly, the actual residue of that estate."
The rule eventually required judicial modification to prevent injustice to the life tenant where payments on account of debts, legacies
and expenses were made early in the yearO and again where they were
'Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Jones, 210 N. C. 339, 186 S. E. 335 -(1936).
See 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §811, n. 3; GODEFROi, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (5th ed. 1927) §284. The problem appears not to have been dealt
with by the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 9 U. L. A. 1935 CuM. ANN.
POCKET PART 167.
Bridgeport Trust Co. v. Fowler, 102 Conn. 318, 128 Atl. 719 (1925).
'York v. Md. Trust Co., 150 Md. 354, 133 Atl. 128 (1926).
'White v. Chaplin, 84 N. H. 208, 148 Atl. 21 (1929).
'Willard's Ex'r v. Willard, 21 Atl.'463 (N. J. Ch. 1891); It re Rowland's
87 N. J. Eq. 307, 101 Atl. 52 (1917).
Trustees,
7
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §234 (g).
sL. R. 4 Eq. 295, at p. 303 (1867). It is difficult, in view of the date of that
case, to agree with the view expressed in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Stacy in the principal case, that under N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §970, the
English rule is a part of that body of English common law which North Carolina
adopted from the mother country, and which controls until changed by statute.
'STRAcHAN, The Rule in Allhusan v. Whittell (1914) 30 LAw Q. REV. 481.
"it re McEuen, 2 Ch. 704 (1913).
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made several years later." This change 12 is thus phrased by the Restatement of Trusts :13 "A proper method of determining the extent to
which legacies, debts and expenses of administration should be paid out

of the principal is by ascertaining the amount which, with interest
thereon at the rate of return received by the executor upon the whole
estate from the death of the testator to the dates of payment, would
equal the amounts paid. This amount is charged to principal and the
balance of the amount paid is charged to income." The resulting accounting problems 14 are so intricate and difficult that eminent English
conveyancers have suggested the insertion in the will of a clause leaving
the whole matter to the discretion of the trustee.'5
The Massachusetts rule, adopted by statute' in New York in 1931,
and followed by North Carolina in the principal case, awards to the life
tenant the entire income from the date of the death on that part of the
estate used to pay the charges in question. It is based on the theory
that the residue is formed at the testator's death, subject to the payment
of legacies, debts and expenses, and on a presumption that giving the
income to the life tenant more nearly meets what probably would have
7
been the testator's intention had his mind been directed to the question.'
The fact that the life beneficiaries in the principal case were children
and grandchildren, while the remaindermen were those who would have
been heirs had the trustor died intestate at the date of the vesting in
the remainderman, made the availability of a rule based on probable
intention particularly welcome. Accounting problems were thus avoided
and definiteness and simplicity of administration facilitated.
JAMES M. VERNER.
'In re Wills, 1 Ch. 769 (1915).
loc. cit. supra note 9, ably discusses the net significance of the
modification.
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §234(g).
"Compare STRAcHAN, supra note 9, and note (1924) 37 HAv. L. REv. 250.
' STRAcHAN, loc. cit. supra,note 9.
'IN. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1927 as amended 1931) c. 42, §17b. Before this New
York followed what later became the English view. Williamson v. Williamson,
6 Paige Ch. 298 (1837) ; In re Ryan's Estate, 250 N. Y. Supp. 522, 140 Misc. 364
(1931).
3- Mulcahy v. Johnson, 80 Colo. 499, 252 Pac. 816 (1927) ; Weld v. Putnam, 70
Maine 209 (1879) ; Wethered v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 79 Md. 153, 28 Atl.
812 (1894); Minot v. Armory, 2 Cush. 377 (Mass. 1848); Lovering v. Minot, 9
Cush. 151 (1851) ; Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray 341 (Mass. 1855) ; Loring v. Mass.
Horticultural Society, 171 Mass. 401, 50 N. E. 936 (1898) ; Edwards v. Edwards,
183 Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658 (1903); McDonough v. Montague, 259 Mass. 612, 157
N. E. 159 (1927) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500, 165 N. E. 657
(1929) (relied on heavily by the North Carolina court in the principal case) ; cf.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Forsyth Dental Infirmary, 271 Mass. 511, 171 N. E. 734
(1930), where the income went to corpus. Is the distinction between the two cases
that the will did not manifest the usual intention well taken?; City Bank Farmers'
Trust Co. v. Taylor, 53 R. I. 126, 163 Atl. 734 (1933) ; Will of Leitsch, 185 Wis.
257, 201 N. W. 284 (1924).
" STRAcHAN,
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Vendor and Purchaser-Statute of Frauds-Sufficiency
of Memorandum.
The existence of some fifty cases before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina on the question of the sufficiency of a writing within the meanin,of the Statute of Frauds1 is evidence of the difficulty and the continuing
importance of the subject. The frequency with which the problem has
recurred on appeal suggests the difficulty of prediction with which the
lawyer is confronted. This note was undertaken with the hope that a
study of the cases would lead to the discovery of some more or less
predictable rules. The hope has not been justified by the study. However, it is felt that a statement of available generalities, with a frank
recognition of their limitations, along with the collection of cases on
the point, will prove of some value to the practicing attorney.
The cases seem to group themselves around three general problems:
(1) the sufficiency of the written description of the land to be conveyed;
(2) the necessity of the statement of the consideration and the price;
(3) the sufficiency of signing.
(1) The cases uniformly announce the uselessly vague formula that
the land to be conveyed must be described with "reasonable certainty."2
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §988. "All contracts tot sell or convey any

lands, tenements or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them . . . shall
be void unless said contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person
by him thereto lawfully authorized."
' (a) The following descriptions, with the aid of parol testimony, were held
sufficient: Mizell v. Burnett, 49 N. C. 249 (1857) (letter stating: "You can have
my timber on the tract of land, known as the Walling tract, on Roanoke River
. . . ") ; Carson v. Ray, 52 N. C. 609 (1860) ("My house and lot in the town of
Jefferson") ; Phillips v. Hooker, 62 N. C. 193 (1867) (memorandum to effect that
agent agreed for "Mrs. Hooker to make a deed for her house and lot north of
Kinston to the said J. R. Phillips . . ."); Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C. 293
(1883) ("Received of G. T. five hundred dollars on account of the sale of my interest in the 'Lenoir lands,' owned by myself and J. W. T.") ; Gordon v. Collet,
102 N. C. 532, 9 S. E. 486 (1889) ("Beginning at a stake on Grant's comer running
north with the Rocky Ford road to Tate's line ... and then with said line to the
beginning; containing 114 acres, more or less"; on the same piece of paper: "Received of Austin Collett $33, in part payment on a lot on Rocky Ford road . . ."
"M. C. Avery." On the opposite side of same paper: "I, Austin Collett, promise
to pay Mrs. M. C. Avery 53 dollars on a lot adjoining W. Grant's on the Rocky
Ford road, by March 1, 1886. Austin Collett"); Falls of Neuse Manufacturing
Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S. E. 568 (1890) (land on which vendee "now
lives") ; Love v. Harris, 156 N. C. 88, 72 S. E. 150 (1911) (note made by auctioneer on back of notice of sale of lands to -the effect, "Sold to C. J. for $1,50022
January, 1910") ; Bateman v. Hopkins, 157 N. C. 470, 73 S. E. 133 (1911) ("Received of W. E. Bateman $5, to confirm the bargain on the purchase of the farm
on which I now live . . .") ; Lewis v. Murray, 177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750 (1918)
("Received on account of trade on home place one hundred dollars. From D. B.
Lewis"); Buckham Land and Timber Co. v. Yarbroug, 179 N. C. 335, 102 S. E.
630 (1920) (all that tract of land in two certain counties, lying on "both sides of
old road between" designated points and bounded by lands of named owners "and
others"); Norton v. Smith, 179 N, C. 553, 103 S. E. 14 (1920) -(". . . J. A. Smith
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This gives rise immediately to the problem of the admissibility of parol
evidence. It may be said generally that if a particular piece of land is
mentioned in the paper, and if parol evidence will reveal that such description refers to only one piece of land owned by the vendor, the
writing is sufficient.3 For example, under this test, a memorandum
purporting to convey the land "on which I now live" has been held
good. 4 On the other hand, if the attempted description is such that, as
revealed by parol evidence, it may apply to one or more tracts of land
owned by the vendor, the attempted conveyance is said to be within the
has sold to W. H. Norton his entire tract or boundary of land consisting of 146
acres . . .") ; Harper v. Battle, 180 N. C. 375, 104 S. E. 658 (1920) (a check
stating that it was "payment on Watts Street House") ; McCall v. Lee, 182 N. C.
114, 108 S.E. 380 (1921) (agreement by mother with her children that if they
would convey her what their father had left them, she would combine the whole
of their father's estate with the greater part of her own estate and make an equal
division to the children) ; Gilbert v. Wright, 195 N. C. 165, 141 S.E. 577 (1928)
("Agreement made ... of sale of her home property on Pennsylvania Avenue and
Cypress Street. . . .Dr. Wright agrees to buy the vacant lot from Mrs. 0. F.
Gilbert, during the month of January, 1925, for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars.").
(b) The following descriptions were held insufficient and parol testimony held
inadmissible: Allen v. Chambers, 39 N. C. 125 (1845) ("Received of Mr. Drury
Allen two hundred and forty dollars, in part for a certain tract of land lying on
Flat River, including Taylor Hicks' spring-house and lot, etc., and adjoining the
land of Lewis Daniel, Womach, and others"); Plummer v. Owens, 45 N. C. 254
(1853) ("1841, W. P. to H. C. 0., Dr. To 4 loads of Rock one lot at one year's
credit, $125") ; Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77 (1858) ("Received of A. C.

Murdock ...in part payment of one house and lot in the town of Hillsboro") ;
Capps v. Holt, 58 N. C. 153 (1859) ("Received . . . of Henry Capps $100, in
part payment ... on a bargain made by us for a tract of land on the North side
of the Watery Branch, in the County of Johnston, and state of North Carolina,
containing 150 acres . . .") ; Farmer v. Batts, 83 N. C. 387 (1880) ("Received
of W. D. Farmer fourteen hundred dollars, in full payment of one tract of land,
containing one hundred acres more or less, it being the interest in two shares
adjoining the lands of James Barnes, Eli Robbins, and others") ; Breaid v. Munger, 88 N. C. 297 (1883) ("In settlement with A. E. Breaid, Kipp and Munger
owed him $316.30 to be applied to his 100 acres of land and the lot where he now
lives is paid for in full"); Fortescue v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910
(1890) ("Charles Crawford
Land ..................................................... 125.00
Paid ...................................................... 61.58

Balance due ........................................... $ 63.42
1 Jan., 1875") ; Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485,
11 S.E. 568 (1890) (bond for title to convey thirty acres of land of the "Deaver
Tract," which tract contained more than thirty acres) ; Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C.
473, 17 S.E. 539 (1893) ("19 April, 1880-James Harris has paid me $20 on his
land, owes me six more on it.").
' Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C. 293 (1883) ; Falls of Neuse Manufacturing
Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S.E. 568 (1890); Bateman v. Hopkins, 157
N. C. 470, 73 S.E. 133 (1911); Lewis v. Murray, 177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750
(1918) ; Norton v. Smith, 179 N. C. 553, 103 S.E. 14 (1920) ; Harper v. Battle,
180 N. C. 375, 104 S.E. 658 (1920). For the description used in these cases, and
for other cases, see (a) under note 2, supra.
Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S.E. 568
(1890); Bateman v. Hopkins, 157 N. C. 470, 83 S.E. 133 (1911).
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prohibitions of the Statute. 5 From this has evolved the familiar formula
that parol evidence is admissible to identify the land already described
in the paper, but not to a describendu.mn not already indicated therein. 6
The value of such a rule is limited. Close cases make hazy the distinction between a description and an identification. 7 At first glance, it
might seem that this difficulty is absolved by virtue of the presence of
another statute which reads that "in all actions for the possession of or
title to any real estate, parol testimony may be introduced to identify
the land sued for. .. ." But, whatever may have been the purpose
of this statute, it has been treated as merely reiterating the same rule
as to the admissibility of parol testimony as existed theretofore. 9 Thus
it has had no effect in the evolution of a workable formula as to what
constitutes a sufficient writing under the Statute of Frauds.
(2) A noted writer' 0 on the subject has stated that a memorandum
to be sufficient must contain all the essential elements of the agreement,
including a statement of the consideration and the price. The North
Carolina decisions are not in accord with this conclusion. It has been
held that the consideration need not appear:" in the memorandum, but
that a statement of the price must.1 2

This calls forth the explanation

that "consideration" is a much broader term than that of "price. ' 3.
Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77 (1858) ; Farmer v. Batts, 83 N. C. 387
(1880) ; Fortescue v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910 (1890) ; Lowe v. Hatris,
112 N. C. 473, 17 S. E. 539 (1893). For the description used in these cases, see
(b) under note 2, supra.
'Higdon v. Rice, 119 N. C. 623, 26 S. E. 256 (1896) ; Norton v. Smith, 179
N. C. 553, 103 S. E. 14 (1920); Gilbert v. Wright, 195 N. C. 165, 141 S. E. 577
(1928).
"Carson v. Ray, 52 N. C. 609 (1860) (memorandum called for sale of "My
house and lot in the town of Jefferson," and the court held that parol evidence was
admissible to identify the land). But in Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77 (1858),
where the description was "One house and lot in Hillsboro," parol testimony was

held inadmissible, since that would be aiding the description and not identifying
land already described.

(Michie, 1935) §1783.
'Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C. 473, 17 S. E. 539 (1893).
8 N. C. CODE ANN.

The court said that the

Act did not change the law in reference to contracts and deeds relating to land, the
word "description" being used in this Act to mean one which has a legal susceptibility of being aided by testimony so as to identify the land, not a description

which is in law no description whatever.

= POM ROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) §87.
' Miller v. Irvine, 18 N. C. 103 (1834) (the court said consideration

was not
part of the contract, but only the inducement to it) ; Ashford v. Robinson, 30 N. C.

114 (1847) ; Nichols v. Bell, 46 N. C. 32 (1853) ; Green v. Thornton, 49 N. C. 230
(1856) ; Kent v. Edmonston, 49 N. C. 529 (1857) ; Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C.
293 (1883) ; Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N. C. 485, 11 S.
E. 568 (1890); Haun v. Burrell, 119 N. C. 544, 26 S. E. 111 (1896); Peele v.
Powell, 156 N. C. 553, 73 S. E. 234 (1911); Bateman v. Hopkins, 157 N. C. 470,
(1911) ; Lewis v. Murray, 177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750 (1918).
73 S. E. 133
'Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104 (1904).
"In Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104 (1904), the court said:
There is
"It is true that the consideration of the contract need not be stated....
quite a difference between the price to be paid by the vendee and the consideration
necessary to support the contract and enforce it against the vendor.

The latter
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There are two probable explanations for this. First, the court has applied the familiar rule that consideration may always be shown by parol
testimony. Secondly, the party "to be charged" is usually the purchaser,
and the court has said that the terms of the bargain necessary to bind
him must appear in the memorandum. Since, under the first of these
explanations, a statement of the consideration is not an essential part
of the writing, the contract is enforceable against the vendor in the
absence of a written inclusion of the consideration, but is not enforceable against a purchaser unless the writing contains a statement of the
price. This seems an untenable inconsistency.
(3) The provision of the statute requiring that the agreement or
memorandum thereof shall be signed "by the party to be charged" has
been interpreted by the court to require a signing only by the party
against whom the contract is sought to be enforced. 14 It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff who has not signed the paper, may enforce a
specific performance, although no relief could be obtained against him
on his correlative obligation. Hence the criticism that the doctrine of
mutuality of obligation is violated. 15 The cases merely exemplify the
general rule that the signing of an instrument requires the writing of
one's name with the intention thereby to authenticate the instrument.' 0
These prerequisites appearing, the precise manner of inscription on the
paper is immaterial.' 7 It need not be his own name ;18 it may be written by a third person ;19 and it may appear on any part of the instru20
ment.
need not contain
may be shown by parol, as at common law, and the writing ...
any matters but such as charge him, the vendor, that is, such stipulations as are to
be performed on his part. He is to convey, and the writing must be sufficient to
show that this duty rests on him as one of the parties to the contract when he is
sought to be charged. The vendee is to pay a certain price, and the writing must
likewise show his obligation-its nature and extent-when the action is against
him. It must show the price, for, otherwise, the true contract of the vendee as
to one of its essential terms would not be reduced to writing, and we could not
see from the writing what it is so as to enforce it against him. If we permitted
the vendor to supply this defect by parol proof, it would at once introduce all the
mischiefs which the statute was intended to prevent."

"Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104 (1904); Lewis v. Murray,
177 N. C. 17, 97 S. E. 750 (1918).
POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONMRACTS (3d ed. 1926) §75.
" McCall v. Textile Industrial Institute, 189 N. C. 775, 128 S.E. 349 (1925).
' Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 S. E. 902 (1891) (name signed by
"his mark") ; Burris v. Starr, 165 N. C. 657, 81 S. E. 929 (1914) (endorsement
on back of note) ; Harper v. Battle, 180 N. C. 375, 104 S. E. 658 (1920) (endorsement on a check).

"Hargrove v. Adcock, 111 N. C. 166, 16 S. E. 16 (1892)

(agent signing in his

own name).
" Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C. 134, 12 S. E. 902 (1891) (auctioneer's signature); Proctor v. Finley, 119 N. C. 536, 26 S. E. 128 (1896) (auctioneer's
signature on notice of sale of lands) ; Combes v. Adams, 150 N. C. 64, 63 S. E.
186 (1908) (agent).

O'Burris v. Starr, 165 N. C. 657, 83 S.E. 929 (1914) ; Flowe v. Hartwick, 167
N. C. 448, 83 S.E. 841 (1914).
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In conclusion it may be said that the vagueness of the Statute itself
and the constantly varying fact situations which arise make impossible
the development of adequate rules as to what constitutes a sufficient
writing. Although the cases are replete with judicial utterances that
the Statute must be rigidly enforced, the court at times has been extremely lenient in upholding seemingly incomplete memoranda. This
occasional laxity may be explained in two ways. There may be unusual
hardship in the particular case. Or, the court may be seeking an indirect means of avoiding the strict North Carolina rule regarding part
performance.2 1
STATON P. WILLIAMS.
Workmen's Compensation-Notice to Employer-Filing of ClaimsAction Under Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Employee was killed in an accident in December, 1929, while in defendant's employ. Defendant was a self-insurer and reported the accident to the industrial commission at once, offering to pay the claim.
Plaintiff, the employee's administrator, without filing a claim, notified
the defendant and the commission that he would proceed under the Federal Employers' Liability Act rather than the Workmen's Compensation
Act. After various rulings and an appeal under the Federal Act1 the
plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 1935 the plaintiff petitioned for
an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act and requested a hearing before the industrial commission. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the claim was not barred by the one year statute of
limitations as it was pending before the industrial commission during
2
the entire period.
Generally, before the injured employee or his personal representative
can recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act he
must comply with the statute in two respects. First, he must notify
the employer of the accident either within a limited time after the injury or as soon thereafter as is practicable.3 While the notice is usually

'North

Carolina does not allow -part performance of the contract to take the

contract without the statute. Hall
48. v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104

(1904); (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv.
"Hanks v. Utilities Co., 204 N. C. 155, 167 S. E. 560 (1933).

'Hanks v. Utilities Co., 210 N. C. 312, 186 S. E. 252 (1936).

' The statutes vary in different jurisdictions.
ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §7568 (notice

Only a few are listed below.

to employer within 5 days; no

compensation if after 90 days); ARiz. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §1446
(injury to be reported at once); GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1933) §114-303 (notice immediately; barred after 30 days unless reasonable excuse and employer
shown not to be prejudiced by delay) ; IoWA CODE (1935) §1383 (notice in 15
days; if in 30 days, not barred except as to extent employer was prejudiced; bar
absolute after 90 days) ; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll; Baldwin's Rev., 1936) §§4914,
4915 (notice as soon as practicable); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081
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given in writing few states rule that written notice is a condition precedent to recovery.4 The employer's actual knowledge of the injury5
or verbal notice to him 6 or his agent 7 has been held sufficient. Second,
the employee or his personal representative must file a claim with the
industrial commission or board having jurisdiction of such proceedings,
within a limited time, usually one year, from the date of injury or
death. 8 A failure to follow this provision usually bars recovery0 as the
statute is generally held to be mandatory.' 0 That which is necessary to
constitute a sufficient filing and a sufficient claim is not clear but it has
been held that a letter setting out in detail the facts of the accident" or
(dd) (notice as soon as practicable; barred after 30 days unless reasonable excuse and employer shown not to be prejudiced by the delay) ; TENN. CODE (Shannon, 1932) §6872 (notice as soon as practicable; barred after 30 days, unless
cause shown); UTAH Rav. STAT. ANN. (1933) §42-1-92 (notice in 48 hours,
or penalty;
barred after one year).
4
Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 219 App. Div. 495, 220 N. Y. Supp. 420
(1927) (failure to give employer written notice of death caused reversal of compensation award) ; Beech v. Keicher, 154 Tenn. 329, 289 S. W. 519 (1926) (written
notice of accident condition precedent to recovery notwithstanding employer's actual knowledge).
'Graver Corp. v. State Industrial Comm., 114 Okla. 140, 244 Pac. 438 (1926);
Dep't of Game and Inland Fisheries v. Joyce, 147 Va. 89, 136 S. E. 651 (1927).
' Cook County v. Industrial Comm., 327 Ill. 79, 158 N. E. 405 (1927) ; Hughes
v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N. Y. 201, 156 N. E. 665 (1927).
"Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co. v. Foote, 231 Ala. 275, 164 So. 379 (1935)
(report to employer's surgeon held sufficient); Wilson v. Clement Co., 207
N. C. 541, 177 S. E. 797 (1935) (compensation denied on other grounds) ; Ware
v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 153 Tenn. 144, 281 S. W. 927 (1926).
'ALA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §7570 (claim in one year) ; ARIz. CODE ANN.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §1447 (claim in one year); GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison,
1933) §114-305 (claim in one year); IowA CODE (1935) §1386 (claim in two
years); Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll; Baldwin's Rev., 1936) §4914 (claim in one
year); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081 (if) (claim in one year) ; TENN.
CODE (Shannon, 1932) §6874 (claim in one year) ; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933)
§42-1-64 (death claims barred after one year).
'Hilty v. Fairbanks Exploration Co., 82 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936);
White v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 41 Ga. App. 514, 153 S. E. 574 (1930);
Tricomo v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Mich. 541, 267 N. W. 731 (1936) ;Kaplan v.
Kaplan Knitting Mills, 221 App. Div. 484, 224 N. Y. Supp. 262 (1927); Wilson v. Clement Co., 207 N. C. 541, 177 S. E. 797 (1935) ; State ex rel. Carr v.
Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 130 Ohio St. 185, 198 N. E. 480 (1935); Menna v.
Mathewson, 48 R. I. 310, 137 Atl. 907 (1927). Cf. Pacific Employers' Insurance Co. v. Pillsbury, 14 F. Supp. 156 (D. C. Cal., 1936) (failure to file claim
within statutory time held to be no bar to recovery under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act) ; In re Pahlke, 53 P. (2d) 1177 (Idaho,
1936) (state barred from recovering non-dependent compensation where claim was
not filed within the statutory time).
" Bushnell v. Industrial Board, 276 I1. 262, 114 N. E. 496 (1916); Kalucki
v. American Car and Foundry Co., 200 Mich. 604, 166 N. W. 1011 (1918);
Chmielewska v. Butte and Superior Mining Co., 81 Mont. 36, 261 Pac. 616 (1927);
Wray v. Woollen Mills, 205 N. C. 782, 172 S. E. 487 (1934); 2 SCHNAEIDER,
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAw (2d ed. 1932) §545.
'Williams v. Cities Service Gas Co., 139 Kan. 166, 30 P. (2d) 97 (1934)
Roach v. Durham Const. Co., 52 S. W. (2d) 593 (Mo., 1932); Higgenbotham
v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 155 Okla. 264, 9 P. (2d) 15 (1932); Barwin v. Independent School Dist. of Sioux Falls, 61 S. D. 275, 248 N. W. 257
(1933) ; Hardy v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 58 P. (2d) 15 (Utah, 1936). Contra:
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an oral report to the commission 12 is enough. In North Carolina mere
notice by the employer is an adequate compliance with the statute. 3a
The courts have generally ruled that a common law action by the injured
14
After
employee for damages is neither a claim nor notice of a claim.
the accident is once reported and the commission recognizes the claim,
5
its jurisdiction attaches and continues until the case is decided.'
In the principal case the plaintiff denied the validity of the Compensation Act and sought recovery under the Federal Act, waiting five years
before making a formal claim for compensation under the State Act.
The employer's notice, upon which the commission assumed jurisdiction,
was held to be sufficient to preserve the rights of the plaintiff. Since
the commission cannot dispose of a case except by some award, order,
or judgment, final in its effect, 16 it follows that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing. The bringing of the action under the Federal Act
did not constitute an election of remedies or estop the plaintiff from
thereafter asserting his rights under the Workmen's Compensation
7
Act.'
The court by its liberal interpretation of the statute reading, "The
right to compensation under this article shall be forever barred unless a
claim be filed with the industrial commission within one year after the
accident . .. ., is departing from the apparent intent of the legislature. However, the court is following the general tendency of promotHiggins v. Heine Boiler Co., 328 Mo. 493, 41 S.W. (2d) 565 (1931); Murphy

(2d) 1035 (1931).
v. Burlington Overall Co., 225 Mo. App. 866, 34 S.W.
"Duford v. Escanaba Veneer Co., 246 Mich. 191, 224 N. W. 390 (1929);

France v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 186 S. E. 601 (W. Va.,
1936). Contra: Murphy v. Burlington Overall Co., 225 Mo. App. 866, 34 S. W.
(2d) 1035 (1931). Cf. Yeaver v. State Compensation Comm., 113 W. Va. 257,
167 S. E. 617 (1933) (commission electing to investigate claim in 'which no report
had been filed, must dispose of cases on merits); Cole v. State Compensation
Comm., 113 W. Va. 579, 169 S.E. 165 (1933).
'Hardison v. Hampton and Sons, 203 N. C. 187, 165 S. E. 355 (1932) ; Hanks
v. Utilities Co., 210 N. C. 312, 186 S. E. 252 (1936).
Gas & Fuel Co. v. Thomas, 87 Colo. 486, 288 Pac. 1051 (1930);
'Greeley
Pallanck v. Donovan, 109 Conn. 469, 147 Atl. 14 (1929) ; Cruse v. Chicago, R. I.
and P. Ry. Co., 140 Kan. 704, 38 P. (2d) 672 (1934) ; Schild v. Pere Marquette
R. Co., 200 Mich. 614, 166 N. W. 1018 (1918). Contra: Ackerson v. National
Zinc Co., 96 Kan. 781, 153 Pac. 530 (1915).
'Kennedy v. Industrial Accident Comm., 50 Cal. App. 184, 195 Pac. 267
(1921); Choctaw Portland Cement Co. v. Lamb, 79 Okla. 109, 189 Pac. 750
(1920).
"0Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shilling, 259 S. W. 236 (Texas, 1923);
Todd v. Southern Casualty Co., 18 S.W. (2d) 695 (Texas, 1929).
"'McLead v. Southern Pac. Co., 64 Utah 409, 231 Pac. 440 (1924) (bringing
action in another state under Federal Employers' Liability Act held not evidence of abandonment of claim for compensation) ; Utah Idaho Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 84 Utah 364, 35 P. (2d) 842 (1934) (plaintiff who misconceived his remedy and brought action under Federal Employers' Liability Act
held not estopped from pursuing legal remedy under State Workmen's Compensation Laws).
IsN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081 (ff)a.
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ing the remedial nature of workmen's compensation laws. As most
accidents are reported 19 the employees or their personal representatives
will hereafter usually be privileged to institute experimental suits before seeking compensation under the Act. How can this undesirable
situation be met? Though the commission has the power to call a
hearing on its own motion 20 or on the motion of either party, 2 1 the burden of bringing contestable claims to a speedy settlement should not be
placed on the commission, the employer, or the insurance carrier. To
protect the employer and the insurance carrier from dormant claims an
amendment is proposed 22 by which the employee or his personal representative would be compelled to take action on the claim within one year
after its filing or his rights thereunder would be forever barred. This
proposed amendment would not prejudice the rights of the plaintiff
where he is seeking recovery under the Federal Act, as acceptance of
the state compensation is not a bar to recovery under the Federal Act.28
A further protection is given the plaintiff by the 1933 Amendment
which allows the employee or his personal representative one year in
which to commence an action at law in the event of an adverse judgment
24
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

E. C.

SANDERSON.

"The employer is under a statutory duty to report all injuries. N. C. CoDE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§8081(vvv) a, 8081 (vvv)e.
' The Commission is not expressly given power to call a hearing on its own
motion, but it is given express authority to make rules and regulations for carryout -the provisions of the Act. N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §801(jjj)a.
The commission claims to have the power. Rules and Regulations, no. 14. See
American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Huffman, 187 N. E. 410 (Ind. App.,
1933), where the compensation board was allowed to order that additional parties be joined. Hence it seems that the commission would not be exceeding its
authority by acting on its own motion.
' 1N. C. CoDe ANN. (Michie, 1935) 8081(mmm).
' Following is a proposal for the Amendment, N. C. Coon ANN. (Michle,
1935) §8081(ff)a: "The right to compensation under this Act shall be forever
barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year
after the accident, and if death results from the accident, unless a claim be
filed with the Commission within one year thereafter: and all claims upon which
action is not taken under this statute by the claimant within one year after the date
of filing shall be forever barred."
' New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546,
61 L. ed. 1045 (1917); Neumann v. Morse Dry Docks and Repair Co., 255 Fed.
97 (E. D., N. Y. 1918); Wetterer v. Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry., 277 Ill. App. 275
(1934).
2 P. L. N. C. 1933, c. 449.

